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In the thirty years since the Supreme Court controversially decided that commercial 
advertising is protected by the First Amendment,1 but not as protected as, say, political 
speech, the scope of commercial speech has remained uncertain.  A 1998 lawsuit2 charging 
Nike with misrepresenting its overseas labor practices illustrates how much is at stake.  Nike 
argued that its responses to accusations of sweatshop labor addressed debates about 
globalization that were matters of “public concern,” and therefore warranted the highest level 
of First Amendment protection.3 The plaintiff argued that Nike’s statements were no 
different from ordinary commercial advertising, warranting only the lower degree of 
 1 The doctrine was officially announced in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 2 Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (Super. Ct. Cal. 1998) (No. 994446). 3 Specifically, it could be held liable for false statements only on a showing of “actual malice,” i.e., 
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth. 
2protection appropriate to commercial speech.4 The United States Supreme Court accepted 
review, but instead of providing the “expected ... landmark ruling on the free speech rights of 
corporations,”5 the Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.6 The lawsuit settled 
soon thereafter,7 but its unanswered questions are bound to recur.  How they are resolved is 
of enormous consequence, as made clear by the large number of amicus briefs filed in Nike
by groups representing consumers, labor, environmental interests, civil libertarians, and 
business and advertising interests. 
The importance of deciding what speech is commercial is illustrated by the fact that it 
was generally agreed that resolving whether the statements complained of in Nike were 
commercial speech would be dispositive in determining whether Nike could be found liable.8
More generally, the ability of consumer campaigns to influence corporate behavior with 
respect to the environment, labor practices, and other areas of public impact depends on 
public access to accurate information about that behavior.  Such access becomes more 
difficult as it becomes more difficult to hold corporations accountable for misinformation.9
Indeed any oversight of corporate behavior requires the ability to compel corporations to 
provide information and to penalize them for misinformation.10 As Nike demonstrates, such 
ability will depend in large part on whether the speech in question can be classified as 
commercial.  Still more generally, anyone concerned about corporate dominance over public 
discourse should be concerned about the question of which corporate public speech is 
commercial and may therefore be subject to some regulation.11 
4 Specifically, Nike could be held strictly liable for false statements under California’s unfair business 
practices statutes.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (regulating unfair business competition) 
and §§ 17500 et seq. (regulating false advertising). 5 Linda Greenhouse, Nike Free Speech Case Is Unexpectedly Returned to California, N.Y. Times, 
June 27, 2003, at A16. 6 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003). 7 Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case Over Firms’ Free Speech, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2003, at A8. 8 See Nike, Inc., 123 S.Ct. at 2555; Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 946; id. at 949; id. at 979-80 
(Brown, J., dissenting); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. App., 1st Dist. 2000); 
Brief for Petitioners at 14, Nike, Inc., U.S. S.Ct. (2003). 9 See Brief of Amici Curiae Sierra Club et al. at 1-2, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, U.S. S.Ct. 10 See Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 389 (2002). 11 See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 425 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); C. Edwin 
Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 646, 646 (1982). 
3In this paper I defend a thesis that offers a simple solution to the problem of classify-
ing communications like those for which Nike was sued: all speech by publicly traded for-
profit business corporations12 is commercial.13 
Even readers sympathetic in principle to this suggestion may fear that such an 
approach has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decisions of the last three decades.  In 
its first decision focusing on corporate political speech in the context of campaign finance 
reform, the Court firmly declared, “We find no support ... for the proposition that speech that 
otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection 
simply because its source is a corporation.”14 While Bellotti continues to be cited in 
commercial speech decisions for the proposition that speech should not be treated differently 
because made by a corporation,15 subsequent campaign finance decisions, upholding special 
limits on corporate speech, have largely been ignored in the commercial speech context.16 
Since Bellotti the Court has upheld restrictions on corporate spending and fund-raising in 
connection with federal elections,17 on corporate contributions to nonprofit advocacy 
corporations,18 and on corporate spending on issue advertising (“soft money” expenditures),19 
while finding analogous restrictions on personal spending20 or spending by advocacy 
groups21 to be unconstitutional. 
 12 Hereinafter, except where otherwise indicated, “corporate speech” will be used to refer to speech 
by such entities only. 13 One need not accept this general claim to find that Nike’s statements constituted commercial 
speech under established doctrine.  The speech was made by a commercial speaker to prospective 
buyers, about verifiable facts within its own knowledge, for the purpose of fostering sales.  See 
Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 963-4; Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, U.S. S.Ct., 
2003 WL 21012624, 15 and passim. Inducing customers to buy products through misrepresentation 
is precisely the sort of “commercial harm” that justifies lower protections for commercial speech.  See 
infra sec. IA2; Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not 
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143, 1147.  See also Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 
Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1994) (merchants’ misrepresentations about whether 
products were environmentally friendly constituted commercial harm) 14 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 15 E.g. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 264 (Chin, J., dissenting). 16 One of the only writings to take notice of the implications of post-Bellotti campaign finance 
decisions for commercial speech doctrine is C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen 
Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1161, 1165 (2004). 17 F.E.C. v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 18 F.E.C. v. Beaumont, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (2003). 19 McConnell v. F.E.C., 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). 20 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 21 F.E.C. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
4It is hard to imagine the Court upholding similar limitations on corporate spending 
on, say, product advertising.  Thus, ironically, it appears that, with respect to limitations on 
advertising expenditures, corporations’ speech on matters of public concern is less protected 
than is their commercial speech—just the opposite of commercial speech doctrine concerning 
regulation of advertising content. Although there may be ways of making sense of this 
apparent anomaly,22 it highlights the extent to which commercial speech doctrine has been 
insulated from developments in campaign finance doctrine.  I argue that the rationale for 
treating corporations differently in the campaign finance context applies equally to any 
corporate speech on matters of public concern.23 That rationale, in brief, is that corporate 
speech is not the speech of any speakers. 
The paper begins with a brief introduction to commercial speech doctrine, followed 
by a brief preliminary argument for the conclusion that corporate speech is commercial, 
based on the legal requirement that all corporate activity be directed toward profit.    The 
principal argument comes in Part II, which surveys the First Amendment interests that might 
be implicated in corporate speech.  Corporations cannot have free speech rights for their own 
sake; their speech is protected for the sake of actual human speakers and listeners.  However, 
no speaker interests are at stake in corporate speech: it is not the speech of shareholders, 
officers or directors, or any other constituency.  Meanwhile, case law and theoretical 
considerations suggest that listener interests alone merit only a reduced degree of protection 
 22 The most obvious explanation would be that even though commercial speech is entitled to a lower 
degree of First Amendment protection, state interests in restricting corporate expenditures on com-
mercial advertising are much less weighty.  The problem with that explanation is that most of the 
reasons advanced by the Court for limiting corporate expenditures would equally support limits on 
political expenditures by persons, limits which the Court has declared unconstitutional.  See infra sec. 
IIB1.  But if regulations on corporate speech may be justified by interests that are insufficient to 
justify comparable regulations on speech by persons, it appears that—despite its denials—the Court is 
not treating corporate speech as entitled to the same degree of protection as speech by persons. 23 For the most part, scholars have examined commercial speech doctrine and corporate political 
speech doctrine separately.  But see Baker, supra note 16, at 1180-81;  C. Edwin Baker, Commercial 
Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1976).  Related perspectives 
have been advanced in Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 784-93 and 
818 (1995); and Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech is Not Free, 83
Iowa L. Rev. 995, 1002 (1998).  Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: 
An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 587, 600 
(1991) (noting that “[o]ne need not view corporate political speech as distinct from commercial 
speech,” but defending the political speech rights of corporations on that basis ); Victor Brudney, 
Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 Yale L.J. 235, 274 
(1981) (suggesting that it may be constitutionally appropriate to regulate corporate political speech 
more than corporate commercial speech). 
5under the First Amendment.  Moreover, even from the standpoint of listeners, corporate 
speech has particularly low interest, precisely because it is not the speech of any speaker.  
Finally, in Part III I address objections that reduced protections for corporate speech would 
tilt the “playing field” of public debate unfairly, and that it may be difficult in principle or in 
practice to draw lines between corporate speech and other speech—such as that of the 
press—that unquestionably merits full First Amendment protection. 
I. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The idea that the First Amendment might protect commercial advertising is fairly 
new.  In 1942 the Supreme Court found it “clear” that the Constitution does not restrain 
regulation of “purely commercial advertising.24 That assumption remained unchallenged 
until the 1970s, when the Court began to signal concern for commercial speech,25 
culminating in the declaration that purely commercial speech is not “wholly outside the 
protection of the First Amendment.”26 At the same time, the Court noted that commercial 
speech may require “a different [lesser] degree of protection.”27 Over the last twenty years 
the Court has moved (albeit inconsistently) toward finding increasing protections for 
commercial speech,28 amidst much disagreement about the degree of protection to which 
commercial speech is entitled, and even some disagreement about whether truthful 
commercial speech should be treated differently from other speech at all.29 Still, the doctrine 
 24 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 25 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 
809 (1975). 26 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 435 U.S. at 761, 770. 27 Id. at 771, fn. 24. 28 See David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 1049, 1056-59 (2004).  For example, when the Court in 1996 struck down a Rhode Island 
prohibition on advertising liquor prices, the plurality opinion explicitly disapproved a 1986 decision 
upholding a ban on advertising of casino gambling to Puerto Rican residents.  44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996) (disapproving Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism 
Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 29 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment); id. at 501-04 
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion, joined by Kennedy and Ginsberg, JJ.); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment); Id. at 571-72 (Kennedy, 
J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431-38 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Posadas, 478 U.S. at 350-51 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). 
6remains that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, but less so than speech 
considered more central to the purposes of the First Amendment,30 notably political speech.31 
Because of “its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,” 
commercial speech is “subject to ‘modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the 
realm of noncommercial expression.”32 Specific differences in the treatment of commercial 
speech include less tolerance of false or misleading speech,33 more readily allowing speech to 
be compelled,34 the inapplicability of overbreadth doctrine,35 greater tolerance of prior 
restraints,36 and, most controversially,37 less rigorous standards for allowing truthful speech 
to be regulated to achieve other government ends.38 
30 Commercial speech has been found to merit “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with 
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.” Ohralik v. Ohio, 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978).  This language has been repeated often.  See also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 
418, 426 (1993) (“The Constitution ... affords a lesser protection to commercial speech”) (also 
repeated often). 31 Political speech, or speech on matters of “public concern,” have often been described as at or close 
to the core of speech protected by the First Amendment.  E.g. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
101-02 (1940); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14; Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). 32 Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik). 33 While robust public debate has been found to require tolerating even demonstrably false speech on 
matters of public concern, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964), false or 
misleading commercial speech is considered unprotected by the First Amendment.  E.g. Thompson,
535 U.S. at 367; Edenfield v, Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993).  There is also greater latitude under 
commercial speech doctrine for regulating speech that may mislead.  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 
12-16 (1979). 34 In most contexts, compelled speech is considered to violate freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment.  West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).  With respect to commercial speech, however, the “constitutionally pro-
tected interest in not providing any particular factual information ... is minimal.”  Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (emphasis in original).  See also Va. Bd. of Phar-
macy, 435 U.S. at 771, fn. 24; Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492  (1995) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment).  More recently however, regarding non-factual claims, it has been held that 
compelled commercial speech must pass First Amendment scrutiny. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411. 35 Overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the usual rule that statutes may be challenged only by 
actually injured parties.  Regulations may be challenged on the ground that they substantially violate 
the First Amendment as written, even if they do not violate it as applied in the given case.  E.g. Lovell 
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1938); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
444 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980).  However, “the justification for the application of overbreadth analysis 
applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context.”  Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380 
(1977) (“declin[ing] to apply [overbreadth analysis] to professional advertising,” id. at 381) 
(approved in Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634). 36 “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement 
on First Amendment rights.”  Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).  But “the 
prohibition against prior restraints” is “inapplicable” to commercial speech.  Va. Bd. of Pharmacy,
435 U.S. at 771, fn. 24.  Accord Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10. 37 See supra note 29. 38 Content-based regulation of speech “must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Govern-
ment interest.”  United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  
Narrow tailoring requires that the regulation be “the least restrictive means” of achieving the goal.  
71. What is commercial speech? The Court has hesitated to define commercial 
speech,39 referring often to a “common sense distinction” between commercial and other 
speech.40 The various characterizations offered have been more along the lines of paradigm 
cases or factors to consider.  Roughly, “commercial speech” may be said to refer to tradition-
al product advertisements and whatever seems sufficiently similar to be treated equivalently. 
The best known characterization of commercial speech is speech that “does no more 
than propose a transaction.”41 But that formula is better understood as a paradigm example 
than as a definition or necessary condition.42 The Court has also characterized commercial 
speech more broadly as speech that “proposes a commercial transaction,” without the proviso 
that it do nothing more.43 In applying the doctrine, the Court has treated as commercial 
various speech bearing only an indirect relation to proposing a transaction, including trade 
names,44 professional identification on attorney’s letterhead and business cards,45 real estate 
“Sold” signs (not just “For Sale” signs),46 alcohol content printed on beer bottle labels,47 and 
a condom distributor’s pamphlet “discussing at length the problem of venereal disease and 
the use and advantages of condoms in aiding [its] prevention.”48 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2791 (2004).  Regulation of commercial speech requires only that 
the regulation be “not more extensive than is necessary” to serve a “substantial” government interest.  
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. P.S.C., 447 U.S 557, 566 (1980).  Not only is “substantial” 
interest a lower threshold than “compelling” interest, but “not more extensive than is necessary” has 
been held not to require least restrictive means.  Fox, 492 U.S. at 477.  The Central Hudson standard 
has been labeled “intermediate” scrutiny, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995), 
and described as “a far cry from strict scrutiny,” Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 434 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring), the standard applying to other content-based regulation of truthful speech. 39 See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 
438 fn. 32 (1978); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 536 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring 
in judgment). 40 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56 (1978).  The Court has often repeated this phrase. 41 Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385; Va. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 762; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 
505; Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340; Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 409. 42 The phrase has been said to capture the “core notion” of commercial speech.  E.g. Bolger v. Young 
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); see also United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway 
Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. L.A.P.D. v. United 
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999): “This ‘core notion’ is the beginning of our inquiry, ... 
not the end.” 43 E.g. Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554; Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 
422; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456; Bates, 433 U.S. at 364. 44 Friedman, 440 U.S. 1. 45 Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) 46 Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 47 Coors, 514 U.S. 476. 48 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 62, fn. 4. 
8The other often cited characterization comes from Central Hudson: commercial 
speech is “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience.”49 This characterization likewise does not provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for commercial speech.  Already in a concurrence to Central Hudson itself, it was 
criticized for failing to provide sufficient conditions: “Nor should the economic motivation of 
a speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been motivated 
by the prospect of pecuniary reward.”50 As for the interests of the audience, it has always 
been part of the Court’s rationale for protecting commercial speech that it does not relate 
solely to the audience’s economic interests, but also to political interest in how the economy 
should be managed.51 Even focusing only on the interests of potential consumers, any 
product ads that make claims about the quality of a product, the satisfaction it offers, its 
esthetic value, its hipness, or its safety relate to listeners’ non-economic interests.52 Thus it 
cannot be a necessary condition for commercial speech that it relate solely to the economic 
interests of its audience. 
However, it does seem relevant—perhaps decisive—if the speech relates solely to the 
speaker’s economic interests.  After all, it is implausible that Shakespeare’s motivation for 
writing was solely pecuniary,53 and even more implausible that his pecuniary motivation 
determined the content of his plays.  While no one thinks that courts should probe speakers’ 
motivations, certain sorts of speech, e.g., ordinary product advertising, may be thought of as 
inherently economically motivated, and therefore to be classified as commercial speech. 
At best, then, the Court’s “definitions” of commercial speech are rough pointers.  
Commercial speech is speech closely related to effecting commercial transactions (perhaps, 
 49 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.  See also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204, fn. 17 (1982). 50 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 51 Va. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 764-65 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 52 Interest in such factors could be considered “economic” only in the sense that a consumer might not 
have paid the same price for a given product, had she known that it was not of the quality she sup-
posed, or not safe, etc.  But in this sense, claims about whether a product was manufactured in an 
environmentally friendly way, or—as in Nike—under reasonable working conditions, relate equally 
to the economic interests of a consumer whose buying decisions are influenced by such factors. 53 It is even less plausible with respect to Thomas Paine, whose pamphlets are sometimes cited to 
make the same point.  Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 709 (1992).  Surely, he could have found easier (and safer) ways 
to make a living. 
9speech whose occurrence would make no sense apart from that connection), and/or speech 
whose occurrence and content are motivated largely by the speaker’s economic interests. 
Nor has the Court engaged in much analysis of how to decide whether a specific in-
stance of speech is commercial; it has usually simply assumed that the speech before it is 
commercial or that it is not.54 The Court’s most extensive analysis came in Bolger,55 where 
the Court found that the joint presence of  advertising context, specific product references, 
and economic motivation supported the conclusion that the speech before it was commercial.  
But the Court expressly cautioned that the presence of all three characteristics is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a given instance of speech to be commercial.56 A Nike ad 
showing nothing but the Nike logo and the slogan “Just do it,” perhaps accompanied by 
footage of beautiful people running, is commercial speech if anything is, though it does not 
refer to any specific products.  What seems decisive is again the economic motivation of the 
speaker, as well as some intention to promote a commercial transaction. 
2. Why protect commercial speech less than other speech? Three principal reasons 
have been advanced for why commercial speech should receive a reduced degree of pro-
tection: (1) particular commercial harms are associated with false or misleading commercial 
speech;57 (2) a commercial speaker is usually in the best position to verify claims about his 
products or operations;58 and (3) the profit motive makes commercial speech less easily 
“chilled” by regulation.59 None of these rationales adequately explain why commercial 
speech should receive less protection than political speech. 
(1) Granting that commercial harms may have severe consequences to its victims, it is 
not clear that those harms are more severe than the consequences of a political candidate 
misleading the public about the dangers of some environmental or economic policy, or about 
 54 On occasion the Court has briefly considered whether mixed commercial and non-commercial 
speech should be treated as commercial.  See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 630-32; Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-
75. 55 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 56 Id. at 68, fn. 14. 57 E.g. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 426; Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499, 501, 503. 58 Va. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771, fn. 24.  Accord Coors, 514 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in judgment). 59 Va. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771, fn. 24; Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10; Fox, 492 U.S. at 481; Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 U.S. 749, 758 fn. 5 (1985); Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 
499 (plurality opinion). 
10
the evidence of the military threat posed by another country.  In any event, even if commer-
cial speech is often particularly harmful, that suggests only that it will more often be 
permissible to regulate commercial speech on some neutral standard of preventing harm, not 
that there should be a different—and lower—standard for when regulations of commercial 
speech are permissible, as prescribed by the Central Hudson framework. 
(2) There is some merit to the idea that a business is in the best position to verify its 
claims about, e.g., the contents and qualities of its own products, how they were 
manufactured, etc. (as well as, for that matter, working conditions in its factories).   
However, the same rationale could apply to false statements by political candidates about 
their personal histories, professional record, etc.60 
(3) Commentators have rightly criticized the effort to justify greater restrictions on 
commercial speech in virtue of its greater durability, pointing out both that the degree of 
chilling effect will depend in large part on the magnitude of the threatened penalties,61 and 
that economic motivations for speech are not always more powerful than other motivations.62 
Such criticisms don’t go far enough.  In a way, the Court has it backward: because 
commercial speech is by definition motivated by profit, it will be completely deterred when 
the cost of the expected penalty becomes greater than the expected gain in revenue.  
Commercial speech necessarily has its price.  Non-commercial speech need not: think of the 
speaker who sincerely utters “Give me liberty or give me death.” 
In criticizing the Supreme Court’s justifications for affording lesser protection to 
commercial speech, I do not mean to support those who propose eroding or abandoning the 
distinction.  The point is that the Court has failed to explain satisfactorily why commercial 
speech merits less protection.  A more plausible explanation is that commercial speech 
simply fails to implicate certain concerns that justify First Amendment protections in many 
 60 See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. Rev. 372, 
386 (1979); Lawrence Alexander, Speech in the Local Marketplace: Implications of Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. for Local Regulatory Power, 14 San 
Diego L. Rev. 357, 375 (1977).  The different levels of permissible regulation might be better 
explained by the special dangers of partisan enforcement if false political speech were actionable.  
See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 634-35 (1982). 61 Farber, supra note 60, at 386. 62 Id.; Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 31-32 
(2000); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 
637 (1990). 
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other contexts.  I will argue in Part II that those concerns have to do with protecting the rights 
of speakers. I turn first to an initial defense of the thesis that all corporate speech should be 
treated as commercial speech. 
B. The Fiduciary Responsibility Argument 
The officers and directors (hereinafter referred to collectively as managers) of a for-
profit corporation have a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation’s shareholders to pursue 
corporate profits.63 Any corporate expenditures not directed toward this end constitute 
“waste” of corporate assets.64 It follows that all legitimate corporate expenditures must be 
commercial in a sense, including expenditures to publish speech.65 
The principle that corporate expenditures must be directed toward creating profits has 
been developed in the context of corporate philanthropy.  Because they appear to violate this 
principle, charitable contributions by for-profit corporations were deemed at common law to 
violate the rights of shareholders.66 In the twentieth century charitable contributions by 
corporations came to be upheld on the theory that they would ultimately redound to the 
financial benefit of the corporation by creating good will or community prosperity.67 While 
the right of corporations to make charitable contributions is no longer seriously questioned, 
this rationale continues to be the principal basis for their permissibility.  
The foregoing is no longer unqualifiedly true: modern decisions upholding corporate 
contributions have relied in substantial part on general policy considerations.68 But such 
considerations are generally accompanied by findings that the donations are in the 
 63 The classic statement of this principle comes in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 
(Mich. 1919).  See also Am. Law Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance §2.01(a) (1994); Henry 
T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of 
Shareholder Welfare, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1273, 1278 (1991) (calling this “[[t]he most basic principle of 
corporate law”); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 224 (1990) (calling 
it “the fundamental postulate of corporate law”). 64 See 3A Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corp. § 1102 (database updated 2003); Michaelson v. 
Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979). 65 A similar point is made in passing in Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A 
Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1227, 1259 (1986).  Even 
Nike’s own brief to the Supreme Court acknowledged: “virtually everything a company does is ultim-
ately intended to improve its financial bottom line.”  Brief for Petitioners at 22, Nike, Inc., U.S. S.Ct. 66 6A Fletcher supra note 64, § 2938. 67 A classic statement of this doctrine came in Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 Pac.2d 398, 
401 (Utah 1958). 68 See, e.g,, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). 
12
corporation’s financial interests.69 A weightier qualification is that corporate charitable 
contributions are now authorized by statute in every state.70 In many cases those statutes 
expressly divorce this authority from any showing of specific benefit to the corporation.71 
Still the prevailing doctrine remains that it is the expected benefit to the corporation—good 
will or the prosperity of the community expected to patronize its business—that makes 
corporate donations permissible,72 and donations are still typically justified by managers on 
the basis.73 Moreover, to the extent that corporate charitable donations are authorized apart 
from any expected economic benefit to the corporation, this is an exception to the usual rules 
limiting corporate expenditures to ones expected to profit the corporation.74 The exception is 
generally limited to contributions made “for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or 
 69 See id. at 590 (finding that the donation was made “in furtherance of ... corporate ends” and “in the 
reasonable belief that it would aid the public welfare and advance the interests of the plaintiff as a 
private corporation”) (emphasis added). 70 6A Fletcher supra note 64, § 2939. 71 E.g. Cal. Corp. Code § 207 (e) authorizes corporations to “[m]ake donations, regardless of specific 
corporate benefit, for the public welfare.” (West 2004.)  However, this authority extends only to a 
corporation “in carrying out its business activities” and is “[s]ubject to … compliance with … any 
other applicable laws.” § 207.  For an overview of state statutes governing corporate contributions, 
see R. Franklin Balotti & James. J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reapprisal of Charitable 
Contributions by Corporations, 54 Bus. Law 965 (1999). 72 Such statutes should be interpreted to allow directors to take other interests into account “only as 
and to the extent that the directors are acting in the best interests ... of the shareholders and the 
corporation.”  Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion,
45 Bus. Law 2253, 2269 (1990).   “Even under such express statutory authority, ... charitable gifts are 
subject to challenge if clearly unconnected to the corporation’s present or prospective welfare.”  Cox 
& Hazen on Corporations, § 4.04(1).  “Donations should ... bear some reasonable relation to the 
corporation's interest.”  6A Fletcher supra note 64, § 2939 (discussing contemporary statutory rules).  
Moreover, contributions should not be too large or to inappropriate recipients.  Id.73 Balotti & Hanks, supra note 71, at 968; Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax 
Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DePaul L. 
Rev. 1, 29-32 (1994). While courts will usually not scrutinize corporate contributions closely to see 
whether they appear likely actually to benefit the corporation economically, the lack of scrutiny is 
formally attributed to applying the lenient “business judgment rule,” according to which courts will 
not second-guess judgments about what is in the corporation’s best interests, absent evidence of 
serious negligence or malfeasance.  The business judgment rule has been expressly applied to 
donations, Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 59-61 (Del. 1991), and to corporate political expenditures 
in Marsili v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1975).  For discussion of the wide latitude 
accorded managers under the business judgment generally, and with respect to funding political 
speech in particular, see Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorpor-
ating Corporate Governance Analysis Into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 60 
and 69-73 (2001); Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate 
Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 343, 424 (1981). 74 Balotti & Hanks, supra note 71, at 966.  See also Am. Law Inst., supra note 63, at §2.01(b). 
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educational purposes.”75 It is doubtful that much corporate political advertising (or Nike’s 
claims about working conditions in its overseas factories) fall into this category.76 
In short, all corporate expenditures—including expenditures for corporate speech —
are supposed to further the interests of the corporation, and the interests of the corporation 
are purely economic.  Thus any speech financed by a for-profit corporation, if it is not a 
misappropriation of corporate funds, is commercial, in that the only legitimate criterion for 
deciding to fund the speech is whether it serves the commercial interests of the company.   
So, any legitimate corporate speech is in a sense commercial.  Granted, it need not 
follow that it would be commercial speech, as defined by the Supreme Court.  When 
considering corporate speech, the Court has often denied that the identity of the speaker may 
determine the degree of protection to which speech is entitled,77 and has often taken for 
granted that various instances of corporate speech are not commercial.78 
Nevertheless, the Court’s official characterizations of commercial speech fail to 
undermine the conclusion that all corporate speech is commercial.  First, if “commercial 
speech” is supposed to capture a “common sense” classification79 that is natural to make, 
even if difficult to define precisely, then it is significant that the fiduciary responsibility 
argument implies that corporate speech must be commercial in a natural, non-doctrinal sense 
of ‘commercial.’  Second, as discussed in sec. IA1, about all that can be salvaged from the 
Court’s official characterizations of commercial speech is that commercial speech is 
motivated solely by the speaker’s economic interests, and is related to furthering commercial 
transactions.  The legal constraints discussed in this section make it mandatory that any 
corporate expenditures—including expenditures to publish speech—meet these two 
characteristics. 
 75 Id.76 Matthew J. Geyer, Statutory Limitations on Corporate Spending in Ballot Measure Campaigns: The 
Case for Constitutionality, 36 Hastings L.J. 433, 454 (1985), makes this point with respect to 
corporate expenditures for lobbying, noting that ALI comments narrowly define “public welfare” in 
this context in terms of declared government policies. 77 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 
(accord Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980). 78 E.g. id. at 534-35; P.G.&E., 475 U.S. at 8-9 and 17; Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68. 79 See supra note 40. 
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A fuller defense of the suggestion that the First Amendment status of corporate 
speech in general should be assimilated to that of commercial speech will require a fuller 
inquiry into the First Amendment interests at stake in corporate speech.  I turn now to such 
an inquiry. 
II. SPEAKERS, LISTENERS, AND CORPORATE SPEECH 
The argument begins by defending the premise that if the First Amendment applies to 
corporate speech, it is not because there is a constitutional interest in vindicating the rights of 
corporations per se, but because restrictions on corporate speech might implicate the First 
Amendment rights of people.80 Restrictions on corporate speech are sometimes thought to 
infringe on people’s interest in broadcasting their views.  I refer to this sort of interest as 
“speaker interests.”  More commonly, restrictions on corporate speech are thought to 
implicate the interests of prospective recipients of the speech.  Those interests could be the 
interests of an actual audience in receiving certain information or exposure to certain 
viewpoints, or they could be general societal interests in the free exchange of information 
and ideas.  I refer to both as “listener interests.”81 Associated with each sort of interest are 
rights arguably protected by the First Amendment: “speaker rights,” i.e., rights to express and 
broadcast one’s views, and “listener rights,” i.e., rights to receive information and ideas, or 
the right to a free exchange of ideas in the society at large.82 
The argument then is simply this.  First, no persons’ speaker rights are infringed by 
restrictions on corporate speech.  Second, listener interests standing alone warrant only a 
lesser degree of First Amendment protection—like that accorded commercial speech. 
I also argue, third, that speech that is not the speech of any person is less worthy than 
other speech of protection even on the basis of listener interests.  This last claim, however, is 
not essential for my argument: the first two claims are sufficient to justify the conclusion that 
 80 The law often refers to “natural persons,” in contrast to “artificial persons” such as corporations.  I 
will throughout refer to the former simply as “persons” or “people,” judging that terminology to be 
less misleading.  Regardless of what legal rights are or should be assigned to corporations, a 
corporation is not a person of any kind.  The phrase “artificial person” would correctly be used to 
describe something like a conscious, self-aware android or computer. 81 I include under listener interests the possible interest of some third parties that others receive 
certain information. 82 Cf. Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55
Brook. L. Rev. 5 (1989) (distinguishing between “speaker-centered” and “hearer-centered” First 
Amendment doctrine). 
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corporate speech is entitled to less than maximal First Amendment protection.  (Alternative-
ly, the first and third claims are also sufficient by themselves, even if the second is rejected.) 
Before proceeding further, I defend the premise that there is no First Amendment 
interest in protecting corporate speech for the sake of the free speech interests of the corpor-
ation itself.  If that premise seems too self-evident to require a defense, so much the better. 
A. The First Amendment Rights of Corporations Themselves 
From the beginning, the Supreme Court’s application of the First Amendment to 
corporate speech has been justified on the basis of the rights of people, not of corporations 
themselves.  In the landmark decision first deciding that corporate political speech was 
protected by the First Amendment, the Court made this basis explicit: 
The court below framed the principal question in this case as whether and 
to what extent corporations have First Amendment rights.  We believe that 
the court posed the wrong question. ... The First Amendment ... serves 
significant societal interests.  The proper question therefore is not whether 
corporations “have” First Amendment rights….  Instead, the question 
must be whether [the challenged statute] abridges expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect.83 
Indeed it is hard fathom on what basis corporations might be thought to have indep-
endent First Amendment rights of their own.  As often observed,84 none of the standard 
theoretical explanations of the importance of protecting speakers’ rights make sense with 
respect to corporations. 
The right to speak freely may be justified on the basis that self-expression is essential 
for human flourishing or for basic liberty.85 Corporations are not normally thought to have 
needs for self-expression.86 Similarly, it would be odd to worry about violations of 
corporations’ autonomy,87 or affronts to their dignity,88 as one might worry about persons 
 83 Belotti, 435 U.S. at 775-76. 84 E.g. Baker, supra note 16, at 1163;  Schneider, supra note 65, at 1235 and 1261; Thomas H. 
Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First 
Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14-18 (1979); and references in notes 86-88 and 91 infra.85 This view is associated particularly with Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment (1963).  C. Edwin Baker is a leading current defender. 86 See P.G.&E., 475 U.S. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-805 and 807 
(White, J., dissenting). 87 See Brudney, supra note 23, at 261; David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18
Hastings Const. L.Q. 541, 544 (1991). 88 See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 133, 197 (1998).  
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whose right to express their beliefs was squelched.89 
Alternatively, freedom of speech may be considered essential to participation in the 
political process, which in turn may be considered essential to democracy and to government 
legitimacy;90 the right to elect political leaders is meaningless if citizens and office seekers 
are not allowed to criticize the government.  Corporations are not citizens and are not entitled 
to vote, and the ideal of democracy does not require them to be. Thus corporate speech need 
not be protected on this ground.91 
Of the standard explanations of the importance of free speech, the only one that 
applies plausibly to corporate speech is the general public value of the free exchange of ideas 
and information.  The Supreme Court relied on a theory of this sort in finding that corporate 
speech on matters of public concern was constitutionally protected, basing its decision on the 
First Amendment’s “role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissem-
ination of information and ideas.”92 Such free exchange may be valued as conducive to 
knowledge, on the view that it increases the likelihood of truth coming to be recognized (and 
personal beliefs coming to be better justified).93 Or it may be valued for its contribution to 
autonomous agency, as allowing informed choice among available alternatives.94 Exposure 
to debate among different viewpoints and the ability to receive relevant information may be 
considered essential for democratic decision-making.95 On any of its elaborations, this 
justification of freedom of speech is based on the interests of listeners.  As applied to 
 89 Defamation of a corporation or its products could be described as affronts to a corporation’s 
dignity.  But it is legally actionable, not out of concern for dignity interests, but because it could result 
in financial losses, losses that will be borne by people who have a financial stake in the company. 90 E.g. Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (1993); Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, 
Injustice and the Meanings of America (1999).  The idea that free speech is justified by its connection 
to democratic decision-making comes in versions that emphasize the importance of participating in 
the political process as speakers and versions (like Meiklejohn’s, see infra note 95, that emphasize the 
importance of listeners being able to hear varying points of view.  The former idea does not support 
free speech for corporations; if the latter idea does, it is for the sake of listeners, not of corporations 
themselves. 91 See Schneider, supra note 65, at 1235 and 1261; Greenwood, supra note 23, at 996, 1063, and 
1065. 92 Belotti, 435 U.S. at 783.  See also P.G.&E., 475 U.S. at 8 (a “critical consideration[...]” against 
restrictions on corporate speech was that they “limited the range of information and ideas to which 
the public is exposed” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 93 The classic statement is in John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch. 2. 94 E.g. Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1972 J. Phil & Pub. Aff. 204 
(1972); Redish, supra note 60. 95 The foremost exponent of this view is Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-
Government (1948). 
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corporations, it is based not on any rights or interests of the corporation itself, but on the 
interests and rights of the people who might receive corporate communications (or who 
might have an interest in there being free discussion of the issues). 
The barely intelligible idea that corporations could have independent rights of their 
own, apart from the interests of affected persons, might be suggested by judicial decisions 
establishing that corporations are persons for various legal purposes.  But this manner of 
speaking does not mean that corporations have feelings, interests in self-expression, or other 
characteristics of human beings that make them persons.  While a full discussion of the 
doctrine of corporate personhood would be beyond the scope of this paper,96 two points will 
help to make clear that there is no conflict between that doctrine and the thesis that 
corporations have no constitutional rights for their own sake. 
First, it has never been held that because corporations are considered legal persons for 
some purposes, it follows that they have all the rights of persons.  To the contrary, when 
constitutional rights have been found to apply to corporations, it has always been on a right-
by-right basis, based on discussion of the applicability of the particular right in question.97 
Second, the applicability of various constitutional protections to corporations has 
generally been justified, as with First Amendment protections in Bellotti, as a means of 
protecting the constitutional rights of people.  In the California railroad tax cases, the earliest 
decisions imputing constitutional rights to corporations, it was repeatedly stated explicitly 
that the reason for applying constitutional protections to corporations was to protect the 
 96 For interesting discussions of the history and meaning of the concept of corporate personhood and 
its implications for applying constitutional rights to corporations, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.Va. L. Rev. 173 (1985); Carl J. Mayer, 
Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings L.J. 577 (1990). 97 It took separate decisions to decide that corporations were entitled to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment, Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 
(1889); due process under the Fifth Amendment, Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 
165 (1893); protection against takings under the Fifth Amendment, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922); the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, Armour Packing Co. v. 
United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); and freedom from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment.  
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).  Meanwhile, also in separate de-
cisions, corporations were found not to be protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of either 
Article IV, Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839), or the Fourteenth Amendment, Pembina 
Mining Co. v. Pennslvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888), or the implied constitutional right to privacy.  
California Banker v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).  Within the same decision, Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches was found to apply to corporations, while the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination was found not to apply. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
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constitutional rights of people—specifically the corporation’s shareholders: “whenever a 
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guarantees to persons the enjoyment of property, ... 
the benefits of the provision extend to corporations, and ... the courts will always look 
beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it represents.”98 When the 
Court first stated (in dicta) that Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures apply to corporations, its reasoning was similar: “A corporation is, after all, but 
an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”99 
In many contexts it is only sensible to allow a corporation to bring a legal challenge 
to an alleged deprivation of property, rather than requiring each shareholder to bring her own 
action to recover losses.100 Some of the courts’ other imputations of constitutional rights to 
corporations may seem less sensible to some.  But nothing in constitutional jurisprudence 
points to any ground for corporate rights other than the rights of people, nor does the 
metaphor of corporate personhood provide any basis for finding that corporations in 
themselves possess any of the characteristics of personhood that might be thought to imply 
the possession of intrinsic rights. 
I have argued that the idea that corporations might have rights for their own sake, 
 98 Railroad Tax Cases. County of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 744 (C.C. Cal. 1883).  
The court in that case explicitly contrasted constitutional property rights, which may be enforced by 
corporations, with other constitutional rights, which may not.  Property rights apply to corporations 
“because the property of a corporation is in fact the property of the corporators [shareholders].  To 
deprive the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their 
property or to lessen its value. ... [T]he courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the 
corporation to the persons who compose it, and protect them.”  Id. at 747-48.  In contrast, “the 
prohibition against the deprivation of life and liberty in the same clause of the fifth amendment does 
not apply to corporations, because ... the lives and liberties of the individual corporators are not the 
life and liberty of the corporation.”  Id. at 747.  The brief subsequently filed before the Supreme Court 
for the corporation in that case based its central argument for corporate rights on the same reasoning: 
“A State act depriving a business corporation of its property without due process of law, does in fact 
deprive the individual corporators of their property.” Argument for Defendant, San Mateo v. S. Pac. 
R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1882) (collected in Cases and Points at 12) (emphasis in original) (quoted in 
Horwitz, supra note 96, at 178). 
 The first Supreme Court decision explicitly to hold that corporations had some constitutional 
rights was Santa Clara Cty, 118 U.S. 394.  The Court there gave no reason for its holding that the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to corporations.  But given the context 
of the various contemporaneous California tax cases, and the fact one of the members of the Supreme 
Court that unanimously decided Santa Clara was Justice Field, the author of the San Mateo decision 
quoted above, it may be inferred that Santa Clara was decided on the same reasoning.  See Charles R. 
O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression 
and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 Geo. L. J. 1347, 1353-56 (1979). 99 Hale, 201 U.S. at 76. 100 See Brudney, supra note 23, at 240. 
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apart from people’s rights, is not readily intelligible, much less supported by any doctrine.  
However, the argument of this paper depends only on the narrower claim that corporations 
do not have First Amendment rights of free expression for their own sake, apart from 
people’s First Amendment rights, a claim that could hardly be contested. 
B. Speaker Rights And Corporate Speech 
A corporation itself, I have argued, has no intrinsic right to speak.  But does it follow 
that no rights of speakers are infringed by restrictions on corporate speech?  On one hand, 
regulation of corporate speech does not prevent any shareholder, manager, or anyone else 
from speaking in her own voice on any issue.101 But the Court has long recognized that 
freedom of speech includes the right to “amplif[y]” one’s voice by combining it with the 
voices of others of like mind.102 Justice Scalia has argued on this basis that restrictions on 
corporate spending on political issue advertising are unconstitutional.103 
But are there really any speakers whose right to amplify their voice in this way is 
infringed by regulation of corporate speech?  In this section I defend a negative answer to 
this question, by surveying the various speakers whose rights might be infringed. 
1. Shareholders. The most obvious candidates for speakers whose rights to free 
expression might be infringed by regulation of corporate speech would be the theoretical 
owners of the corporation, on whose behalf the corporation is traditionally taken to speak—
the shareholders.  But it is implausible that a corporation’s political speech speaks for its 
shareholders.104 Many shareholders may disagree with the political positions taken by a 
 101 Justice Scalia has appeared to suggest otherwise.  In Austin the Court upheld some regulation of 
corporate spending to influence elections, in part on the ground that the special privileges, such as 
limited liability, granted by the government to those who wish to incorporate a business, gave the 
government the right to regulate corporate behavior.  494 U.S. at 658-60.  Scalia responded: “It is 
rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First 
Amendment rights.”  Id. at 680.  Set aside that this is not true—the State does just that when, for ex-
ample, it requires confidentiality agreements in awarding contracts to do certain work.  The key point 
here is that setting limits on the use of the corporate form is far different from asking people to give 
up their pre-existing speech rights in exchange for the right to incorporate.  No existing or proposed 
regulations on corporate speech diminish any rights that any speaker had before incorporating.   102 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.  See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 
(1958). 103 McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at 724 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 104 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 806 (White, J., dissenting); O’Kelley, supra note 98, at 1363; Brudney, 
supra note 23, at 257-58; Bezanson, supra note 23, at 786-87.  Greenwood argues further that the 
fiduciary responsibility to maximize profits does not even allow managers to consider shareholders’ 
preferences.  Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1021, passim; Greenwood, supra note 23, passim.
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corporation in which they invest; other shareholders may be undecided or indifferent.  Even 
those who do agree did not for the most part invest in order to express their political views.  
If Nike’s speech about overseas working conditions were indeed contributions to debate 
about a matter of public concern, as its advocates maintain, rather than just sales pitches, 
there would be no more reason to think that its views are those of a given shareholder than 
that they are those of anyone else.  That may be slightly over-stated, in that some potential 
investors with strong views about globalization might refrain from investing in Nike because 
of those views.  Thus the average Nike investor might be slightly more likely than the 
average citizen to agree with the Nike perspective on globalization.  But only very slightly, 
especially in view of the high proportion of securities owned by pension funds, mutual funds, 
or other institutional investors,105 with little or no control by the beneficiary as to choice of 
investments.  The further Nike’s speech ventures beyond proposing a commercial 
transaction—“the core notion of commercial speech”106—the less reason there is to think that 
Nike is speaking for its investors.  And when Nike’s speech does fall within those narrow 
bounds, it speaks for investors only in the sense of acting as their business agent, not in the 
sense of representing their beliefs. 
While the Court has not paid attention to this point in its commercial speech 
jurisprudence, it has acknowledged the point in the context of campaign finance reform.  
There the Court has upheld some degree of regulation of corporate speech largely on the 
ground of the possible divergence between the political positions taken by a corporation and 
the views of its shareholders, though it has conceived the relevance of this divergence in a 
somewhat different way.  Essentially, the Court has reasoned that, although corporations 
have free speech rights, those rights may be over-ridden by the compelling state interest in 
protecting shareholders from having their money used to support ideas with which they 
disagree.  That interest was considered compelling, because, on the accepted doctrine that 
 105 Already in 1990 53.3% of all outstanding equity was found to be held by institutional investors.  
Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the Repeal of 
Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, 1992 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 223, 226 (1992).  The relevance 
of this  point to refuting the claim that corporate speech is shareholder speech has been recognized in 
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1212, 1247 (1983). 106 Bolger, 463 U.S. 60 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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funding speech is speech,107 such use of shareholders’ money would amount to compelled 
shareholder speech, in violation of shareholders’ free speech rights.   
This reasoning was first introduced in 1982, when the Court upheld a federal 
campaign finance reform statute that prohibited corporations and labor unions from spending 
general funds to influence federal elections.108 The Court found that such restrictions did 
infringe on First Amendment associational rights, but that such rights were “overborne”109 by 
two asserted government interests, the second of which was “to protect the individuals who 
have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candid-
ates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be op-
posed.”110 In 1990 the Court upheld a state statute prohibiting corporations from spending 
treasury funds to support or oppose political candidates,111 because the statute could be justif-
ied as remedying “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that 
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to 
the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”112 The Court apparently reasoned 
that, because shareholders do not usually buy stock in order to support political ideas, corpor-
ate political expenditures—unlike most other political expenditures—do not reflect public 
support of any ideas—hence the “distorting effects” of corporate spending.113 The concern 
for shareholder speaker interests was made more explicit in Justice Brennan’s concurrence: 
“A stockholder might oppose the use of corporate funds drawn from the general treasury— 
which represents, after all, his money—in support of a particular political candidate.”114 The 
need to protect individuals from having their money used to support candidates that they may 
oppose was again cited in 2003 in upholding prohibitions on corporate election-related 
spending.115 Allowing corporations to set up independent political action committees made 
possible corporate political participation “without the temptation to use corporate funds for 
 107 Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, (1976). 108 Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197. 109 Id. at 207. 110 Id. at 208. 111 Austin, 494 U.S. 652. 112 Id. at 660. 113 The Court has not been inclined to find similarly distorting the fact that supporters of different 
viewpoints often lack equal resources to support their respective views. 114 Austin, 494 U.S. at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 115 Beaumont, 123 S.Ct. at 2206. 
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political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or 
members.”116 
The importance of protecting shareholders from funding political speech with which 
they do not agree was not the only rationale offered by the Court for upholding restrictions 
on corporate speech, but it was the only one that made clear why corporate speech should be 
treated differently from speech by people or other organizations.  The principal other 
rationale advanced for restricting corporate political spending was that such spending poses 
special dangers of political corruption, because the special privileges associated with 
corporate form allow for the amassing of large sums of capital.  Those sums “should not be 
converted into political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from 
legislators who are aided by the contributions.”117 However, ever since Buckley, the Court 
has held that any limits on individual spending are unconstitutional, meaning that the amass-
ing of large sums of capital is not in itself sufficient to justify regulation of expenditures.  
Nor does it seem sufficient if those large sums were amassed though the state-conferred 
benefits of the corporate form: the Court has never suggested that individual expenditures 
might be limited when the source of the individual wealth is investments in corporate stock.  
The decisive consideration distinguishing corporate expenditures from others must have been 
the possibility of using shareholders’ money for political purposes they do not support.118 
It might be worried that the foregoing reasoning could undermine the principle that 
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable 
aspect of ... freedom of speech.”119 After all, the NAACP too might broadcast statements 
with which some members disagree.120 The difference is that people join and contribute to 
 116 Id. at 2211.  See also McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at 695 (citing same). 117 Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 207.  Similarly, see also Mass. Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. at 257-59; Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-60.  The exchange of monetary support for political favors is 
the only sort of political corruption that the Court has found a compelling interest in preventing 
through campaign finance regulation. 118 A similar analysis has been offered by, e.g., Winkler, supra note 88, at 154-65; Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, 
Communities, and the State, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1229, 1241-44 (1991). 119 357 U.S. at 460. 120 See Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech In an Open Society, 238-39 (1992) (criticizing Austin on this 
basis). 
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organizations such as the NAACP precisely for the purpose of making their views heard.121 
Knowing that they will not agree with every position espoused by the organization, members 
and other contributors judge that on balance their views will find more expression if they 
support the organization than otherwise,122 and support the organization for that reason.123 As 
Dan-Cohen puts it, members “trade accuracy for volume” in broadcasting their views.124 
Therefore, restrictions on political speech by such advocacy organizations do infringe on the 
speaker interests of members.  In contrast, regardless of whether they agree with, disagree 
with, or have no views at all concerning Nike’s corporate position on globalization, investors 
simply do not invest in Nike in order to “pool[...] financial resources for expressive 
purposes.”125 Consequently, regulation of corporate speech does not infringe on their 
interests as speakers. 
This contrast too has been acknowledged by the Court in the context of regulations on 
spending.  Three years after upholding restrictions on corporate political spending, the Court 
found that, despite their corporate form, political action committees “designed expressly to 
participate in political debate, are quite different from the traditional corporations organized 
for economic gain,”126 and therefore could not constitutionally be subjected to the same 
regulations.  A year later the Court found it unconstitutional to apply limits on corporate 
political spending to an anti-abortion advocacy group.127 In contrast to shareholders (and 
union members), who need to be protected from corporations’ (or unions’) using their money 
“for purposes that [they] may not support,”128 “[i]ndividuals who contribute to [the advocacy 
 121 This contrast between corporations and advocacy organizations has been noted in the context of 
restrictions on corporate political spending.  E.g. Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 1244-50; Brudney, 
supra note 23, at 261. 122 If the organization’s speech departs too far from their expectations, they may withdraw their mem-
bership, as many ACLU members did when the ACLU defended the right of Nazis to march in 
Skokie. 123 Cf. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 261 (regarding individual contributions to political action 
committees, “It is true that a contributor may not be aware of the exact use to which his or her money 
ultimately may be put....  However, individuals contribute to a political organization in part because 
they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of advocacy than spending the money 
under their own personal direction”). 124 Id. at 1249. 125 McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at 724 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted supra).  Deliberately chosen “socially 
responsible investments,” in, say, “Fair Trade” coffee enterprises or non-polluting manufacturers, 
might constitute a partial exception. 126 F.E.C. v. Nat’l Conservative P.A.C., 470 U.S. 480, 500 (1985).   127 Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 128 Id. at 260. 
24
group] are fully aware of its political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they 
support those purposes.”129 
In a dissenting opinion in Austin, Justice Scalia sharply criticized the rationale that 
restrictions on corporate political spending can be justified on the basis of protecting 
shareholder speaker interests:130 
A person becomes a member of that form of association known as a 
for-profit corporation in order to pursue economic objectives, i.e., to 
make money. ... [I]n joining such an association, the shareholder 
knows that management may take any action that is ultimately in 
accord with what the majority (or a specified supermajority) of the 
shareholders wishes, so long as that action is designed to make a 
profit.  That is the deal. ... His only protections ... are (1) his ability 
to persuade a majority (or the requisite minority) of his fellow 
shareholders that the action should not be taken, and ultimately (2) 
his ability to sell his stock.131 
Various commentators have pointed out the inadequacies of these shareholder protections.132 
But for present purposes the cogency of such responses to Scalia does not matter.  Scalia’s 
only disagreement with the Austin majority concerns the majority’s finding that limitations 
on corporate speech actually protect shareholder speaker interests.133 On Scalia’s view, 
shareholders essentially have no speaker interests in the corporation’s speech—they invest 
for reasons unrelated to expressing their political or social views.  Thus both Scalia and the 
majority reject the view that limits on corporate speech infringe shareholders’ speaker 
interests.134 
129 Id. at 260-61. 130 A majority in Austin had upheld restrictions on corporate spending as applied to the Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce on the basis of the contrasts developed in the cases discussed above.  
Although the Chamber was a non-profit corporation, the Court reasoned that it was relevantly more 
similar to a business corporation than to an advocacy organization.  Austin, 494 U.S. at 661-65. 131 Id. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The concession that all corporate action must be “designed to 
make a profit” supports the thesis that all corporate speech must be commercial in a significant sense. 132 E.g. Winkler, supra note 88, at 165-68; Joo, supra note 73, at 40-59; Greenwood, supra note 104, 
at 1038-43. 133 Scalia and the Austin majority shared the assumption that corporate speech falls under the 
protection of the First Amendment, independent of any shareholder speaker interests.  The majority 
found, and Scalia denied, that the protection of shareholder speaker interests provides a compelling 
state interest that justifies some regulation of corporate speech nevertheless. 134 On the majority view, limits on corporate political speech protect shareholder speaker interests, 
seeming to imply that those limits do not infringe shareholder speaker interests.  However, 
restrictions on corporate speech could be viewed as protecting the speaker interests of some 
shareholders at the expense of others, as suggested by descriptions of a “stand-off between dueling 
First Amendment rights” of managers and majority shareholders, on the one hand, whose speaker 
interests are served by corporate speech, and dissenting shareholders, on the other, whose speaker 
interests are protected by not being made to subsidize speech with which they disagree.  Martin H. 
Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the 
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If there is an interest in “protect[ing] the individuals who have paid money into a cor-
poration ... for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to 
support political candidates to whom they may be opposed,”135 there is a similar interest in 
protecting Nike investors from having their money used to support views about globalization 
to which they may be opposed.  At any rate, the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence—in-
cluding Scalia’s dissent in Austin—supports at least the conclusion that corporate speech on 
matters of public concern is not an exercise of shareholder speaker interests.  So, if any 
speaker rights are infringed by regulation of such speech, they are not those of shareholders. 
2. Managers. If corporate speech on public affairs is not shareholder speech, perhaps 
it can be considered an exercise of the speaker rights of the managers who set the relevant 
corporate policies and commission the speech in question.  While restrictions on corporate 
speech might not completely muzzle such a manager, who can still speak out in her own 
voice on any issue, they would substantially limit her ability to broadcast her message.  Such 
restrictions might thus be thought analogous to limiting the political spending of an 
individual, or even to denying an individual access to certain media of communication. 
But, as discussed in sec. IB, the proper criterion for deciding on corporate speech ex-
penditures is whether the speech is expected to be profitable for the corporation.  A manager 
has no more right to use corporate funds to broadcast his own views than he has to use them 
for his personal enrichment.136 There is no First Amendment right to broadcast one’s views 
with “other people’s money.”137 
Theory of Free Expression, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235, 277 (1998) (rejecting such a description).  
But there is no reason to suppose that even most shareholders agree with the speech.  And even if 
many shareholders do agree, it is still not their speech, in that it is not advanced for the purpose of 
expressing their views, and in fact would likely occur regardless of whether they agreed. 135 Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 208. 136 See Corbin v. Corbin, 429 F. Supp. 276, 281 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (“corporate funds simply cannot be 
used to meet an officer’s personal desires”).  Various authors have noted that this principle applies to 
corporate speech. E.g. Shelledy, supra note 87, at 583; Greenwood, supra note 23, at 1002. 137 The phrase is borrowed from Winkler, supra note 88, at 155-56, who makes essentially this point.  
See also Joo, supra note 73, at 76 and 81.  An opposing view is advanced by Larry E. Ribstein, who 
argues that First Amendment protection does not depend on the legitimacy of the speech’s funding. 
The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 95, 133-34 (1995).  But if 
that were right, any regulation of expenditures for speech by fiduciaries would be presumptively 
unconstitutional.  The value of free expression has never been thought to make it legal to steal to 
finance publication of one’s views.  See Brudney, supra note 23, at 247. 
The Buckley doctrine that funding speech is the constitutional equivalent of speech implies 
that who pays for the speech determines who is the speaker.  On this basis, it has been found 
unconstitutional to compel someone to fund speech with which she disagrees.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. 
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If, on the other hand, the responsible managers are not broadcasting their own views, 
but conscientiously fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities by broadcasting those views they 
believe to be in the best economic interests of the corporation, then there is no longer reason 
to view the speech in question as their speech.  Managers’ speaker interests are not infringed 
if they are prevented from broadcasting messages that do not express their own beliefs.138 
What if the manager’s own views coincide with those she thinks in the corporaion’s 
interests?  It would be wrong to say that such convergence is accidental.  It may well be 
easier for managers to do their jobs if they identify with the corporate point of view; those 
with views sympathetic to the corporation may be more likely to be promoted to positions of 
authority.  Such convergence may decrease the degree of “role-distance” subjectively 
experienced,139 but it doesn’t affect the analysis.  To the extent that the manager is acting as 
faithful agent of corporate interests, it is those interests that determine the “output” of 
corporate speech.140 The manager who shares the corporation’s views may be compared to a 
printer working for the New York Times, who finds that he agrees with the editorials he is 
printing.  The editorials are not his expression—they would read identically if he held 
different views.  (This would be true even if he took the job because he tends to agree with 
Times editorials.)   Insofar as the manager’s own views do exert influence (perhaps 
 
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); United Foods, 533 U.S. 405.  
Restrictions found unconstitutional on a utility’s inclusion of leaflets in its billing envelopes were 
distinguished from earlier permissible restrictions on the basis of whose property was used to advance 
ideas.  Con Ed, 447 U.S. 539-40.  By the same reasoning, speech by a manager using funds to which 
she is not entitled is not the manager’s speech. 138 See Baker, supra note 23, at 7; Bezanson, supra note 23, at 755 (“speaking under the First 
Amendment requires that the words ... must reflect the utterer’s own ideas, or intellectual free will”).  
For example, regulations of speech by lawyers representing clients are subject to less stringent review 
because they do not represent the lawyers’ own self-expression.  Id. at 794-95.  See also Greenwood, 
supra note 23, at 1056 (when agents speak for principals, it is the principals whose free speech rights 
are protected by the First Amendment).  Cf. Belotti, 435 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting) (“Ideas 
which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection”) 
 That the speech of those who speak for the corporation is not their own is illustrated by Dan-
Cohen, who notes that the speech of a corporate spokesperson is usually—and appropriately—marked 
by a fairly high degree of “role-distance,” i.e., a low degree of personal identification with the role. 
Supra note 118, at 1237-41.  He illustrates the point with the example of the telephone operator who 
says, “’Thank you for using AT&T.’”  Id. at 1239-41.  To modify his discussion slightly, it would be 
inappropriate to respond, “Do you really mean that?  Are you really grateful?”  An executive at Nike 
may feel more identified with the contents of press releases on globalization she authorizes, but a 
similar point applies.  Insofar as she is conscientious with respect to her fiduciary responsibilities, the 
press releases she authorizes are not her speech. 139 See preceding note. 140 See id. at 1238; Shelledy, supra note 87, at 583. 
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unconsciously) over what perspective she ends up regarding as in the corporation’s best 
interest, she is again moving in the direction of illegitimately appropriating corporate 
resources to propound her own viewpoint. 
In short, to the extent that the managers responsible for authorizing the contents of 
corporate political communications base their decisions on what is in the corporation’s best 
economic interests, the speech is not theirs.  To the extent that those decisions are based on 
their own views, managers have no right to use corporate funds to broadcast the speech.   So, 
in neither case would regulation of the speech in question infringe managers’ speaker rights.  
One might wonder whether the foregoing argument relies too heavily on the 
assumption that shareholders are the real owners of corporate assets, an assumption which 
could reasonably be viewed as a legal fiction.  That assumption has been challenged in 
particular by the “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation141 proposed by ‘Law and 
Economics’ scholars.  On this view, corporations should be seen not as belonging to 
shareholders, but as embodying a series of contracts by which investors provide capital to 
entrepreneurs in hopes of a favorable rate of return.  It has been suggested that such a con-
tractarian view of the corporation makes it harder to justify treating corporate speech 
differently from speech by natural persons under the First Amendment.142 And indeed 
Justice Scalia seems to appeal to a view of this sort of the corporation, when he attacks the 
rationale that limitations on corporate political spending protect shareholders’ First Amend-
ment interests: “in joining such an association, the shareholder knows that management may 
take any action..., so long as that action is designed to make a profit.  That is the deal.”143 
But again the most that follows is that shareholders’ speaker rights do not require 
government regulation of managers’ use of corporate assets to finance political speech.  It by 
no means follows that such regulation infringes managers’ speaker rights.  Perhaps the First 
 141 Important early presentations of the theory include Armen A. Alchien & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organizations, 62 Am. Econ. L. Rev. 777 (1972); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).  For an overview, see Millon, supra note 63, at 
229-31 (1990). 142 E.g. Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment: Bellotti and 
Austin, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 317, 363 (1991); Ribstein, supra note 137, at 134-35. 143 Austin, 494 U.S. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted to make this point in Watts, Jr., supra note 
129, at 360). 
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Amendment, in combination with the right of freedom of contract could be thought to imply 
a right for managers to as much financing of their speech as they could possibly achieve 
through free bargaining, notwithstanding any inequality in bargaining position.144 But even 
if managers have a right to seek contracts calling for corporate funding of their speech, it 
does not follow that the state must require shareholders to accept such a contract as a 
condition of corporate investment.  But that is what the state would be doing if restrictions on 
managers’ use of corporate funds to finance speech in support of their own views were ruled 
unconstitutional.  In any event, restrictions on corporate speech would not prevent the 
management of a given firm from seeking to contract for arrangements according to which, 
as part of managers’ compensation, shareholders must contribute a contracted-for sum of 
money to finance the broadcasting of managers’ political and social views.  If it seems 
unlikely that shareholders would consent to such a bargain, that is all the more reason for 
thinking that this is not the bargain actually struck,145 and that restricting corporate political 
speech would serve to enforce, rather than undermine, the actually intended bargain. 
Other corporate constituencies represent even less plausible candidates for speakers 
whose First Amendment rights might be infringed by regulation of corporate speech. 
3. Spokespersons. To the extent that the person who actually delivers the corporate 
speech is different from the one who determines its contents, it is even less plausible that 
speaker interests are at stake.  The employee who merely delivers a statement drafted by 
others, or who writes up a statement whose content is determined by others, is even more like 
Dan-Cohen’s AT&T operator.146 The speech simply is not his.  If anything, his speaker 
interests are constrained, rather than realized, if he is asked to say things he does not 
believe.147 A spokesperson may feel disappointed if restrictions on corporate speech result in 
his losing opportunities to be seen or heard on TV by a large audience.  But no First 
Amendment interests are at stake in the desire of some individuals to have their face widely 
 144 Even Justice Scalia does not fully subscribe to that view, as he accepts the limitation that manage-
ment’s actions—including its political speech—must be “designed to make a profit.”  Austin, 494 
U.S. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted supra). 145 See Joo, supra note 73, at 76. 146 See, supra note 138. 147 Legally, compelled speech is deemed to violate the speaker rights of the speaker.  See infra note 
154.  Psychologically, Dan-Cohen points out, organizational spokespersons typically “experience the 
role’s imperatives as external, and thus potentially as constraints.”  Supra note 118, at 1238. 
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seen or their (literal) voice widely heard. 
4. Workers. Other corporate employees lack input into the contents or delivery of 
corporate speech.148 Therefore, the speaker interests of those employees cannot be infringed 
by regulation of corporate speech. 
Some speech motivated by corporate interests may be perceived to be in the interests 
of workers as well, insofar as corporate prosperity may be thought to lead to increased job 
security or opportunities for advancement for workers.  But that does not make it the work-
er’s own expression.  Moreover, a corporation is just as likely to advocate policies that lessen 
protections or benefits for workers.  It is implausible that Nike’s speech on globalization is a 
medium for self-expression of the production workers employed by the Asian manufacturers 
with whom it contracts, or of its own domestic employees whose jobs or wages may be 
threatened by Nike’s reliance on those Asian workers. 
To the contrary, it is common for corporate employers to restrict their employees’ 
speech—even off the job—to minimize interference with the corporate message.  While such 
restrictions, at least by private employers, are usually not considered constitutionally prob-
lematic, because they do not involve state action, they illustrate the implausibility of the 
claim that corporate speech furthers employees’ speaker interests.  The point is illustrated by 
a 1983 debate on whether to rehear a Third Circuit decision that was unusually protective of 
speaker rights of a corporate employee against his employer.149 One judge criticized the 
opinion for “fail[ing] to consider ... the first amendment interests of corporations.”150 In 
other words, far from being exercised through corporate speech, the speaker interests of 
workers might need to be sacrificed to vindicate corporate speech rights. 
5. Advertisers. Finally, restrictions on corporate speech could be thought to infringe 
the speaker interests of the writers and producers of corporate advertising (hereinafter, ad-
vertisers).  Although advertisers are, like spokespersons, principally mouthpieces for some-
one else’s message, the creativity they bring to the presentation of that message might be 
 148 Where they do have input into content, or a role in delivering the speech, the arguments above 
concerning managers or spokespersons apply respectively.  It may be that almost all corporate 
employees sometimes serve as corporate spokespersons, but that wouldn’t affect the argument. 149 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).  See infra note 190. 150 Id. at 903 (Statement of J. Becker sur the Denial of the Petition for Rehearing). 
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considered self-expression protected by the First Amendment.  If regulation of corporate 
speech is likely to result in an overall decrease in the quantity of corporate advertising, 
because of fears of liability, advertisers’ speaker interests might be thought to be infringed by 
a decrease in opportunities for self-expression of this sort.  But this concern is based on 
empirically questionable premises and a dubious conception of the First Amendment. 
First, it is far from clear that regulations on corporate speech would in fact result in 
fewer opportunities for advertisers.  Regulations compelling certain disclosures could lead to 
an increase in advertising opportunities.  Regulations requiring greater accuracy in 
advertising could lead to more clarifications and increased give and take between rival points 
of view, potentially resulting in an overall increase in advertising.  They could also lead to 
more careful production of advertisements, increasing the number of creative jobs in the 
advertising industry. 
More importantly, it is implausible that the probability of such consequences has any 
bearing on the constitutionality of regulations of corporate speech.  Let us suppose that 
writing or producing advertising provides more of an outlet for artistic creativity than most 
other high-paying jobs, and that such creativity may be thought of as a form of self-
expression.  True, the First Amendment protects manner of expression as well as content, and 
it has been held to protect non-propositional expression, such as music.151 Nevertheless, it is 
doubtful that the First Amendment extends so far as to protect opportunities for creativity for 
the sake of creativity—as opposed to creativity as a means of expressing one’s own 
viewpoint.  A government regulation that incidentally resulted in a decrease in well-paid 
opportunities for musicians would not for that reason be unconstitutional.  Or suppose instead 
that some government regulation of the garment industry had the effect that garment workers 
had fewer opportunities to be creative in their stitching.  That would be an unfortunate 
consequence, but it is implausible that the regulation would therefore violate the First 
Amendment. 
 151 “Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”  
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).  But a composer, or even a performer of 
music composed by someone else, is expressing her own perspective in a way that an advertiser is not 
expected to.  At any rate, performing music is not at the core of what the First Amendment protects.  
Ward concerned vocal music with words, performed for an explicit political purpose, leaving open to 
question to what extent the First Amendment protects music of which neither of those facts were true. 
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Of course, there are important differences between stitching and speech.  But the 
most notable difference is that speech is more usually associated with expression of a point 
of view.  (If some stitching expressed a point of view, it too would be considered speech for 
First Amendment purposes, like flag burning.152) The stitching example supports the 
conclusion that there is no First Amendment interest in protecting opportunities for creativity 
for their own sake, apart from expressing a point of view.  If that is right, no First 
Amendment interests of advertisers are implicated in regulation of corporate speech. 
In summary, restrictions on corporate political speech do not violate the speaker 
rights of any person, because corporate speech is not expression of any person.  It is not the 
expression of shareholders, because it is made regardless of whether shareholders agree with 
it, and shareholders do not invest in order to support it.  It is not the expression of managers, 
because, if the managers are acting responsibly, decisions about the content of corporate 
speech are not made on the basis of their own beliefs.  In any event, managers do not have a 
constitutional right to use corporate resources to express their own views.  It is even clearer 
that corporate speech is not the expression of corporate mouthpieces who have no input into 
its content, or of other workers.  Nor is it the expression of advertisers, in that it does not 
express their viewpoint either, even if it does afford them some opportunities for creativity. 
C. Free Speech And The Protection Of Listener Interests 
I have argued so far that corporations have no speech rights of their own, and that 
restrictions on corporate speech do not infringe any persons’ speaker rights.  If that is correct, 
extending First Amendment protections to corporate speech could be justified only on the 
basis of listener interests.  I argue in this section that listener interests alone support a lesser 
degree of protection for speech than do speaker interests.  A complete defense of this thesis 
would require a full-fledged theory of the purposes of protecting free speech.  Instead I 
advance several considerations.  I argue first that much First Amendment jurisprudence 
makes sense only on the premise that listeners’ rights to receive speech are not as weighty as 
speakers’ rights to express themselves.  I then argue that this premise is plausible: it is hard to 
make theoretical sense of a strong right to receive speech.   Finally, I argue that the 
 152 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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differences between the rights of listeners and speakers provide the best explanation of the 
lesser protection accorded commercial speech. 
1. Listener interests in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Much First Amendment 
jurisprudence is unintelligible apart from an implicit assumption that listener rights merit less 
absolute protection than do speaker rights. 
Most strikingly, it has never been disputed that it is the speaker who ‘owns’ the 
speech interest, so to speak.  It is the speaker who can choose to waive, or bargain away, his 
right to ‘inform’ the public.  This principle applies even where First Amendment protections 
are justified on the basis of listener interests, as with commercial advertising. Cigarette or 
alcohol distributors, for example, may agree to refrain from certain kinds of advertising in 
exchange for release from certain types of liability.  This would be difficult to understand, if 
the public’s right to receive the advertising were accorded as much weight as speakers’ 
rights.153 
The assumption that a potential speaker may waive his right to speak follows from the 
widely accepted premise that the First Amendment protects against compelled speech.  But 
that premise itself reflects the greater weight accorded to speaker interests in comparison to 
listener interests.  Compelled speech is considered unconstitutional because it infringes on 
the speaker’s rights of free expression.154 From the listener’s standpoint, on the other hand, it 
is hard to see why compelled speech is not often a good thing.  Granted, not all compelled 
speech is informative: consider compelled recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.  But when a 
cigarette manufacturer is required to state on every package that cigarette smoking may be 
 153 Granted, when a speaker waives his right to broadcast some information, that need not prevent 
listeners from receiving it from another source.  Thus one might argue that a certain symmetry 
obtains: just as a listener can refuse to listen but cannot waive a speaker’s right to communicate to 
other listeners, so a speaker cannot waive a listener’s right to receive the same information from other 
speakers.  However, there will often be few, if any, alternative sources of the same information for 
listeners.  Thus a speaker’s waiving his right to broadcast a certain message may result in that mes-
sage being lost altogether. Moreover, even if all potential listeners agreed to waive their right to 
receive some message, it is doubtful that they could legally prevent the speaker from transmitting it. 154 The classic statement of this principle came in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), finding 
unconstitutional a state law requiring public school children to salute and pledge allegiance to the 
United States flag.  The Court reasoned: “compelling the flag salute and pledge ... invades the sphere 
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve 
from all official control.”  Id. at 642.  The Court has elaborated more recently: “The right to speak 
and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 
‘individual freedom of mind.’”  Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637) (finding 
it unconstitutional for state to punish person who covered over state motto on his car’s license plate). 
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harmful to one’s health, useful information is conveyed.155 
Another example of this primacy comes from the context of campaign finance regula-
tion, where the Court has upheld limits on contributions to campaigns, while striking down 
limits on what an individual may spend in direct support of her own candidacy or on direct 
broadcasting of her own views.156 While holding that the First Amendment applies to both, 
the Court has distinguished between the two largely on the ground that, unlike limits of the 
latter sort, limits of the former sort entail “only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s 
ability to engage in free communication,”157 because a contribution expresses only general 
support, not the particular beliefs or reasons of the contributor.158 In other words, a restriction 
on contributions is a significantly lesser infringement of speaker interests in expression.159 
But it is not a lesser infringement of listener interests: if a would-be contributor is prevented 
from contributing $1 million to the candidate of her choice, listeners are “deprived” of $1 
million worth of communications, as much as if the same person is prevented from spending 
$1 million to broadcast her own views.160 So, listener interests in contributions and 
expenditures for political communications are much the same, but expenditures receive 
greater protection because they are taken to implicate speaker interests to a significantly 
higher extent. 
In this context the Court has often repeated: “the concept that government may 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
 155 Compelled speech is allowed in this instance, presumably, because it is considered commercial 
speech.  See Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 156 Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.  The weight attaching to the distinction between ‘contributions’ and 
‘expenditures’ has been repeatedly reaffirmed.  157 Id. at 20. 158 Id. at 21. 159 Contributions merit less protection than expenditures for speech, because, “[w]hile contributions 
may result in political expression …, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves 
speech by someone other than the contributor.”  Id. This distinction is relevant to the contributor’s 
speaker interests, but of little consequence from the standpoint of listener interests. 160 The Court denied that “contribution limitations ... would have any dramatic adverse effect on the 
funding of campaigns and political associations,” id. at 21, reasoning: “The overall effect ... is merely 
to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to 
compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend 
such funds on direct political expression”  Id. at 21-22.  This reasoning is unconvincing.  Candidates 
presumably always try to raise as many funds as they can from every possible source; therefore, it is 
unlikely that they can make up from other sources for lost contributions.  The claim that the funds 
would likely be spent on direct political expression instead may be true in the case of a would-be 
contributor of $1 million.  But a would-be contributor of $100, would have a difficult time turning 
that money into direct political expression—mass public communication is expensive. 
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others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”161 This formula too illustrates the priority 
given to speaker interests over listener interests.  From the standpoint of listeners’ interests, if 
suppressing one source of information would allow the same information, and more besides, 
to be received from another source, then it is hard to see why the first source should not be 
suppressed.162 But from the standpoint of speaker interests, the formula makes sense.163 A
speaker’s interest in expressing her views can reasonably be seen as a fundamental aspect of 
political liberty or personal autonomy that should not be violated—no matter how benign the 
intended effects.  Thus the Buckley formula privileges the speaker standpoint over the 
listener standpoint. 
Ironically, a similar priority can be seen in Kleindienst v. Mandel,164 a case often 
invoked as a precedent for recognizing strong listener rights under the First Amendment.  
Mandel was a European Marxist academic, who had been invited to address various 
audiences in the United States, but was denied a visa to enter.  While it was conceded that his 
rights as a speaker were not protected by the First Amendment, because he was neither a 
citizen nor a resident of the U.S., his exclusion was challenged as infringing on the First 
Amendment rights of U.S. citizens to hear his views.  The Court agreed that First 
Amendment concerns were implicated by the interests of those who wanted to hear Mandel, 
but in the end upheld his exclusion under the plenary power of Congress over the admission 
of aliens.  There is no doubt that Mandel’s right to deliver lectures would have been upheld 
had he been a U.S. citizen, though listeners’ interests would be the same in either case.  Thus, 
despite dicta affirming listeners’ rights,165 the outcome was analogous to that of the campaign 
finance cases just discussed: equal listener interests do not receive equal protection when the 
recognized speaker interests are not equal. 
More recently, the Court has cited a number of precedents, including Mandel, for 
 161 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (therefore rejecting limits on political spending). 162 Granted, most real-life scenarios are unlikely to allow such clean balancing: suppressing certain 
sources of information or ideas, etc., might more likely allow other information, ideas, etc. to be 
heard.  In that case, it might be hard to judge that certain restrictions would allow more total infor-
mation, ideas, etc. to be heard without judging the relative value of the different ideas to which 
listeners might be exposed.  Such judgments of the relative value of different ideas may be part of 
what the Court takes to be antithetical to the First Amendment. 163 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 1245-46. 164 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 165 Id. at 762-65. 
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recognizing the First Amendment importance of listener interests.  In the remainder of this 
section I argue that, like Mandel, none of those cases in fact recognized listener rights as 
strong as speaker rights.166 Listener rights have become prominent in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence only since the Court has become interested in finding some rationale for 
protecting commercial speech and corporate political spending.  
One commonly cited precedent for the right to receive information is Stanley v. 
Georgia,167 where the Court found prosecution for private possession of obscene materials to 
be unconstitutional.  Despite language citing a “right to receive information and ideas, 
regardless of their social worth,”168 the case was really about a right to privacy—the 
appellant’s “right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own 
home[,] ... the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library.”169 Stanley
did not protect either listeners’ or speakers’ rights in the public sphere: prohibitions against 
distributing the same obscene materials were not struck down. 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.170 upheld a fairness doctrine requiring radio 
stations to provide air time for response to persons attacked on air.  This case was genuinely 
decided on the basis of listener rights: rejecting radio stations’ complaints that the 
requirement violated their First Amendment rights, the Court held: “It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”171 But that 
holding was tied to the specific context of radio broadcasting.  Because only a finite number 
of broadcast frequencies are available, some applicants must be denied broadcast licenses.  
Therefore, “it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right of broadcast 
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.”172 So, the fairness 
doctrine could be upheld, not because listener rights trumped speaker rights, but because no 
 166 For a different analysis of why earlier cases do not provide robust justification for a right to 
receive information and ideas, see Schneider, supra note 65, at 1246-52. 167 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 168 Id. at 564. 169 Id. at 565.  The Court continued: “[A] State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own 
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”  Id. A concurring opinion, signed by 
three Justices, found the prosecution illegal solely in virtue of the Fourth Amendment, without 
reference to the First Amendment.  Id. at 569-72 (Stewart, J. concurring in result). 170 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 171 Id. at 390. 172 Id. at 388. 
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speaker rights were violated.173 Moreover, the holding was not that a fairness doctrine was 
constitutionally required, but only that it was constitutionally permissible.  Red Lion and 
similar cases provide no support for the idea that the First Amendment protects listener 
interests to the same degree that it protects speaker interests. 
Perhaps the strongest intimation, outside the context of commercial or corporate 
speech, of a constitutional right to receive information comes from Lamont v. Postmaster 
General.174 Lamont concerned a statute under which the Post Office would destroy unsealed 
mail from foreign countries that was determined to be ‘communist political propaganda,’ 
unless the addressee requested the mail in writing.  This requirement was found “an uncon-
stitutional abridgement of the addressee’s First Amendment rights.”175 Presumably, if the 
statute had applied to domestic mail as well, there would have been no doubt that it was un-
constitutional; so, even here, the rights of listeners may be viewed as less robust than those of 
speakers.  In any event, the statute directly implicated the addressee’s rights of political asso-
ciation and dissent in a way that the loss of a single voice from public debate would not.  It 
was also expressly aimed against a certain point of view in a way that restrictions on corpor-
ate speech are not.  And it concerned communications actually sought by the recipient.176 
In Procunier v. Martinez,177 another case on the right to receive mail, the Court struck 
down interference with prisoners’ mail on the basis of their correspondents’ interests in 
receiving mail from inmates, as well as in having their communications to inmates 
received.178 But the Court expressly denied that the decision was based on positing listener 
rights: “We do not deal here with difficult questions of the so-called ‘right to hear’ ... but 
with a particular means of communication in which the interests of both parties are 
inextricably meshed.”179 
173 See id. at 389 ( “[n]o one has a First Amendment right to a license” to broadcast). 174 381 U.S. 301. 175 Id. at 307. 176 Schneider, supra note 65, at 1238-40 and 1250, argues that early listeners’ rights cases all crucially 
concerned an individual’s right to receive information that he actually wanted, rather than a general 
imputed public interest. 177 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 178 Id. at 408-09. 179 Id. at 409. 
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Classic cases on the First Amendment rights of labor180 are sometimes cited as pre-
cedents for a public right to receive information or ideas.  But although those cases justify 
free speech protections in terms of a general public interest in full, free discussion, it is 
speakers, not listeners, who are held to be protected directly.181 Early strong statements of a 
right to receive information explicitly derive that right from a right to transmit, implying the 
priority of the latter right.182 
In short, precedents provide only limited support for a right to receive communica-
tions where no one has a right to transmit them, and still less support for vesting such a right 
in the general public, independent of any indication of interest in receiving the commu-
nications.  On the other side, differential protection of campaign contributions and expen-
ditures, or of communications originating from alien and domestic speakers, as well as the 
general presumption against the constitutionality of compelling speech, make sense only on 
the premise that listener interests in communications in which there is no protected speaker 
interest are less protected by the First Amendment than are communications that involve 
speaker interests.  In the following subsection I argue that this premise makes good sense. 
2. Theoretical considerations. It is widely supposed that many fundamental con-
stitutional and statutory provisions protect innate human rights,183 sometimes called “natural 
rights,”184 that exist in some sense independent of—and provide the justification for—their 
legal recognition.  For example, most of us believe that it is not our laws that make murder a 
violation of the rights of the victim; rather, we have laws against murder because we believe 
 180 The most important cases are Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88 (striking down statute prohibiting loitering 
and picketing at the scene of a labor dispute), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (striking 
down registration requirements for union organizers). 181 See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101-02 (freedom of speech embraces liberty to discuss publicly); id. at 
102 (Constitution guarantees right to disseminate information); id. at 104 (right to discuss is 
protected; challenged regulations rule out any avenue for those interested to convey their message); 
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 532 (right to discuss and inform is protected); id. at 537 (right to urge action is 
protected). 182 See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 183 E.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds) (“the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be 
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the 
Constitution.  This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points....  It is a rational continuum”). 184 The phrase “natural rights” carries realist, if not theological, connotations that I wish to avoid.  In 
speaking of innate rights, I make no claims that they are of divine origin, nor even that they exist 
independently of cultural norms.  But if they derive from cultural norms, then those norms are 
fundamental ones: legal norms derive from them, rather than vice versa.
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that murder violates the victim’s rights.  For two reasons, the right to receive information can 
less readily be understood as an innate human right than can a right to express one’s views 
freely to whomever may listen. 
First, the idea of a right to receive information (or ideas, etc.) is problematic, in that 
there seems to be no one with a corresponding obligation to provide information.  In general, 
rights are necessarily correlated with obligations.  If I have a negative right185 not to be 
killed, then others must have a corresponding negative obligation not to kill me.  I can have 
no positive right to the food I need to live, unless someone has a corresponding obligation to 
provide that food.  It is not problematic in this respect to suppose that I have a right to 
express my views, because it is plausible enough that others have a corresponding obligation 
not to suppress my expression.  In contrast, it is problematic to posit a positive right to 
receive information, because it does not seem plausible that anyone has a corresponding 
obligation to supply information.  As noted in the preceding section, even when speech is 
protected on the basis of listener interests, no one doubts that the speaker has the right to 
refrain from that speech.  No one has suggested that the First Amendment obligates the 
government—or anyone else—to take positive steps to make information or ideas 
available.186 Moreover, the Bill of Rights in general tends to protect negative rights to be 
free from government interference.187 Thus, to the extent that the First Amendment is 
interpreted to imply a positive right to receive information (as opposed merely to a negative 
right not to be silenced), it becomes somewhat anomalous. 
A natural response might be that the First Amendment does not confer a positive right 
to receive information, but only a right not to have the state interfere with one’s receipt of 
information, just as First Amendment protection of expression is usually thought to guarantee 
speakers neither the resources to broadcast their views nor even freedom from suppression by 
any party, but only the right not to have their expression suppressed by the state.  But even if 
the legal protections of speakers and listeners are analogous in this way, this response fails to 
 185 A “negative right” is a right to be left alone or not to have something done to one, in contrast to a 
“positive right” that others take some action. 186 This is not to deny that there may be an obligation to inform (or at least not to conceal 
information) in limited contexts, e.g., if one knew of an imminent threat to the safety of another.  187 “[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”  Jackson v. Joliet, 715 
F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). 
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address the difference in their justification.  The legal right not to have one’s expression 
suppressed by the government can be understood as protecting an innate right of free 
expression.  But the legal right not to have the government interfere with one’s receipt of 
information can less readily be understood as similarly protecting an innate right. 
Nor is it so clear that First Amendment free speech protections apply only against 
government interference.  “There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited 
private censorship”;188 “Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First 
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.”189 On 
occasion courts have recognized limits on private employers’ authority to silence or compel 
employee speech.190 
The second reason for believing that receiving information is a less plausible candid-
ate for an innate right than is self-expression is simply the intuition that receiving information 
seems more a desirable good than a right that may not violated.191 There is a “strong sense” 
of ‘right’ that implies a degree of immunity from utilitarian balancing.192 For example, 
suppose that three hospital patients are dying because organ transplants are unavailable, and 
that the lives of all three could be saved by killing a fourth, healthy person, and distributing 
his organs among the three patients.  The collective welfare would presumably be maximized 
by doing so193 (saving three lives at the cost of one).  If it nevertheless seems wrong to do so, 
it is because we suppose that the fourth person has a right in a strong sense not to be killed, 
whereas the patients do not have a similar right to receive transplants of necessary organs. 
Because it is inherent in political liberty or in personal autonomy, freedom to express 
one’s views can plausibly be seen as a non-instrumental right of this sort, such that it is 
wrong to violate that right, even for the sake of some better outcome, just as one might judge 
 188 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392. 189 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 190 E.g., Novosel, 721 F.2d 894 (finding that at-will employee’s First Amendment rights were violated 
when he was terminated by private employer for refusing to participate in employer’s lobbying efforts 
and for privately stating opposition to employer’s political stand). 191 This argument is derived from Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 1232-48.  See also Neuborne, supra 
note 82, at 25.   192 Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 1232.  This “strong sense” of ‘right,’ explained further at id. at 
1232-33 and 1245-48, is borrowed from Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 188-92 (1977), 
and ultimately from the contrast between a Kantian deontological ethics and a consequentialist ethics. 193 Assuming that all other things are held equal, e.g., the life expectancies of all parties are 
comparable, all four would enjoy their lives equally and would be missed equally if they died. 
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it wrong to kill an innocent person, even to save three innocent lives.194 As noted supra, the 
Court’s rejection of “restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others”195 reflects such a view.  In contrast, receiving 
information may better be seen as simply a desirable good, in that it is generally reasonable 
to trade off the value of receiving certain information against the value of receiving other 
information, or even of realizing other values. 
It would be overstated to say that speaker rights protect basic political liberty, 
whereas listener interests in receiving information and ideas concern only a desirable social 
good that does not implicate fundamental liberty interests.  A state that prevents its citizens 
from receiving communications from outside its borders is an unfree state.  Even so, a 
xenophobic state of this sort, if it allows free exchange of ideas among its citizens,196 seems 
freer than one that stifles expression by its own citizens. 
The example of the xenophobic state suggests that there might be general interest 
in—and perhaps right to—open debate in one’s society that is stronger than listeners’ interest 
in receiving communications themselves.  But if there is such a general interest that is not 
reducible to a conjunction of speakers’ and listeners’ interests, the only further interest that 
might enter the mix would be an interest in third party communications.  For example, while 
I may believe myself adequately informed about global warming, and have no interest in 
speaking publicly on the topic, it may be important to me that my fellow citizens receive 
information about the issue.  But it is hard to see how a right that others receive certain 
information or ideas could be a more fundamental right than listeners’ own right to receive 
them.  If the latter is not a right in a strong sense, then neither is the former. 
If listener rights (including those of third parties) are indeed less fundamental than 
speaker rights, then it makes sense to accord lesser protection to speech—such as corporate 
speech—that is protected only for the sake of listener rights than to speech that is protected 
 194 To say that there is a right in this sense to self-expression is not to say that it would never be 
justified to violate that right to preserve some other value, e.g., to save lives; i.e., the right need not be 
absolute.  But it is to say that there is at least a presumption that it is wrong to violate it in most 
circumstances, even if the benefits of doing so seem to outweigh the costs. 195 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 196 A speaker’s interest in expression includes reaching her intended audience.  Bd. of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982). 
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for the sake of speaker rights.  But even if there were thought to be a right in a strong sense to 
receive information or ideas, it is not clear that such a right would confer on others a right to 
impart the information, as seems assumed in much commercial and corporate speech doc-
trine.  In general, to say that one has a right to something is to say that one may have it if one 
wishes.197 For example, my rights are violated if someone takes my property against my 
wishes, but they are not violated if someone takes it with my permission.  It would seem then 
that if I have no desire to receive certain information, my rights are similarly not violated if I 
am deprived of that information.  If that is right, then it is hard to understand how listeners’ 
rights could give advertisers a right to convey messages to listeners that do not want to 
receive them.  And for many advertisements, it is far from clear that anyone wants to receive 
them.198 If no one wants to receive advertising promoting a desire for tobacco products, then 
listeners’ rights—even if they are rights in a strong sense—provide no basis for tobacco 
companies to claim a right to foist such advertising on the public.  While there may be 
greater public interest in receiving certain other corporate communications, there is no reason 
to attribute to corporations a general right to purvey advertising on the basis of listeners’ 
rights, apart from a showing that someone wants to receive the communications at issue. 
Even if listeners do want to receive corporate communications, and even if it is not 
correct that listener rights are less fundamental than those of speakers, at any rate different 
protections make sense where the principal concern is with protecting listener interests.  As 
already suggested, from the standpoint of protecting listeners, it may sometimes be reason-
able to suppress some speech to allow other speech to flourish.  From the listeners’ stand-
point, some compelled speech may be beneficial.  A focus on listener interests also makes it 
more reasonable to penalize false statements.  Even on the understanding that false state-
ments are protected not for their own sake, but to avoid chilling the exchange of ideas,199 the 
calculation of costs and benefits can be expected to differ where speakers’ rights are not a 
 197 See Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (1972). 198 See Farber, supra note 60, at 397 (“A consumer might pay for product information, but no one 
would willingly pay in advance for the ‘service’ of being persuaded to buy a product not previously 
desired”). 199 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254  (in libel context liability for false statements could deter criticism of 
public officials, because “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” id. at 271, and because 
even true statement could be deterred by “doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so,” id. at 279). 
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concern.  Where the chief concern is with receiving information, it might sometimes be 
reasonable to risk some chilling effects in order to prevent people from being misled. 
These differences call to mind ways in which commercial speech is treated differently 
from, say, political speech.  I argue in the next subsection that this resemblance is not accid-
ental.  At least one prominent First Amendment scholar has made a strong case that the dis-
tinction between the (listener) interest in receiving information and the (speaker) interest in 
self-expression provides the best analysis of how and why to distinguish commercial speech 
from more protected speech.200 I have argued that the only reason for protecting corporate 
speech is to protect listener interests.  Therefore, if commercial speech doctrine is geared 
toward protecting listener interests, that fact supports the conclusion that any corporate 
speech should be classified as commercial, regardless of its content. 
3. Commercial Speech and Listener Interests. From the beginnings of commercial 
speech doctrine, the principal rationale for protecting commercial speech at all has been 
listener interests.  In the first Supreme Court decision to suggest that some commercial 
advertising might be protected by the First Amendment, the reason given for protecting the 
advertisement at issue was that it “conveyed information of potential interest and value to a 
diverse audience.”201 The decision that “squarely” decided that the First Amendment applied 
to commercial speech justified that conclusion on the basis of the interests of consumers and 
of society in general in “the free flow of information.”202 According to the case that 
established the still operative framework for scrutinizing regulations on commercial speech, 
“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising.”203 Similar ideas can be found throughout commercial speech 
jurisprudence.204 
Granted, in more recent decisions the Court has sometimes said that it is not only 
listener interests that are implicated in regulation of commercial speech.205 Nevertheless, 
 200 Post, supra note 62. 201 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822. 202 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 435 U.S. at 763 and 764. 203 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 63. 204 E.g. Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496 (plurality opinion); Coors, 514 U.S. at 481; Edenfield, 507 U.S. 
at 766; P.G.&E., 475 U.S. at 8.  205 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564; Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 479 
(1997) (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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listener interests continue to predominate in explanations of why commercial speech should 
be protected,206 and the Court has stated explicitly that they are primary: “the extension of 
first Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to 
consumers of the information such speech provides.”207 
Moreover, any interests of speakers implicated in commercial speech are primarily—
if not entirely—economic.208 It is not clear that protection of those interests calls for stricter 
scrutiny than due process would require regarding non-speech regulations potentially 
infringing economic interests.  Although the Court has insisted that the First Amendment 
protects speaker interests that are purely economic,209 that is not to say that such interests 
merit the same degree of protection.210 Received commercial speech doctrine implies that 
speech that implicates no non-economic speaker interests merits less protection.  On both the 
Central Hudson and Bolger analyses,211 if speech is motivated only by economic interests, 
that is relevant to classifying it as commercial speech.  But the point of so classifying it is to 
determine that it is entitled to less protection. 
That commercial speech does not significantly implicate non-economic speaker 
interests is a plausible explanation of “the subordinate position of commercial speech in the 
scale of First Amendment values.”212 The correctness of this explanation is supported by the 
weakness of the Court’s usual explanations of the lesser First Amendment status of 
commercial speech.213 
In any event, that fact makes sense of many of the differences in how commercial 
speech is treated.  Where principally listener interests are at stake, it makes sense that there 
would be greater leeway to compel speech214 and to regulate false or misleading statements.  
 206 E.g. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 366-67. 207 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  See also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (“A commercial advertisement is 
constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s business as because it furthers 
the societal interest in the free flow of commercial information”); United Foods, 533 U.S. at 426-27 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 208 See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 564; Glickman, 521 U.S. at 479 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) 209 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 435 U.S. at 762. 210 For an argument that speech motivated solely by profit merits no First Amendment protection at 
all, see Baker, supra note 23, 23-25. 211 See supra sec. IA1. 212 Edge, 509 U.S. at 430 (1993). 213 See supra sec. IA2. 214 See Post, supra note 62, at 27-28; Neuborne, supra note 82, at 40. 
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The Court has explicitly endorsed such reasoning on occasion: “When a State regulates 
commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales 
practices, … the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for according 
constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict 
review.”215 Regarding compelled disclosures, “Because the extension of First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the 
information such speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”216 Others have 
argued that commercial speech doctrine’s focus on protecting listeners explains greater 
toleration of overbroad regulations and perhaps of prior restraints.  Because information is 
fungible, from the listener’s perspective little harm is done if some speakers are deterred 
from speaking, as long as it is likely that some other speaker will deliver the same message, 
whereas “public discourse” serves other values that are undermined by suppression of the 
speech of any speaker.217 The purpose of overbreadth doctrine is to protect unknown 
vulnerable speakers of conscience, who may be silenced by overbroad regulation, whereas 
there is no comparable reason to think that listener interests cannot adequately be 
safeguarded by those listeners or speakers actually affected.218 
In short, the fact that commercial speech implicates speaker interests only minimally 
explains why it should be less protected.  If that explanation is correct, all corporate speech 
must fall into the less protected category, for no speaker rights are implicated in corporate 
speech. 
D. Listeners’ Interest in Receiving Corporate Speech 
I argued earlier that corporations have no interest of their own in free speech, and that 
corporate speech is not the speech of any person.  Therefore, if there are reasons to protect 
corporate speech, they have to do with listeners’ interests in receiving it.  I then argued in the 
 215 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496 501 (plurality opinion).  See also Va. Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 781 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“the elimination of false and deceptive claims serves to promote the one 
facet of commercial ... advertising that warrants First Amendment protection[:] its contribution to the 
flow of accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private decisionmaking”). 216 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (internal references omitted) (emphasis in original). 217 Post, supra note 62, passim, in particular at 29-33. 218 Neuborne, supra note 82, at 38-40. 
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preceding section that listener interests warrant less stringent (or in any event different) 
protection than do speakers’ interests in expressing their views.  In this section I argue further 
that, even from the standpoint of listener interests alone, the value of corporate speech is 
particularly low—precisely because it is not the speech of any person, i.e., it is not offered as 
an expression of any person’s actual beliefs. 
The generally accepted view that listeners have an interest in hearing purportedly 
informative speech or in hearing debate among different points of view presupposes that 
speakers in general at least aim at truth.219 Corporate speech does not.  To say that corporate 
speech is not the speech of any person is to say that, unlike most non-defective speech, it is 
propounded not because it expresses any person’s beliefs, i.e., not because any person 
believes it to be true, but for entirely different reasons.220 
Ironically, it is this very characteristic that underlies one of the most commonly 
advanced arguments for protecting corporate speech: that corporate communications convey 
a unique message, which might be lost to listeners if corporate speech were not protected.221 
Corporate messages are supposed to be unique in that they are often “the joint and 
undifferentiated product of complex decision-making processes,”222 resulting in speech that 
is “irreducibly ‘organizational.’” 223 But to call it “irreducibly organizational” is to say that it 
may not represent the beliefs of anyone involved.  To the extent that the resulting messages 
are believed, individuals will repeat them in their own voice, and so, those messages will not 
be lost even if the corporation is silenced.  The real reason that some unique corporate 
messages could be lost is that corporate speech is “externally motivated, and being exempt 
from the requirement of sincerity, it is avowedly cut off from the speaker’s own identity and 
psychological state.  [Therefore, the speaker] may be neither inclined nor able to perform the 
same speech acts outside of her office hours....”224 In other words, those corporate messages 
 219 Granted, speakers do not always aim at truth.  But lies are not valued; they are protected only 
incidentally, because of the fear that suppressing them would chill other speech. 220 Cf. Baker, supra note 23, at 16 (“neither the management, the owners, nor the workers ... need 
have any belief in the content of the commercial advertisement. ... The only necessary belief about the 
advocated activities is that their promotion will increase profits”). 221 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 1234-48; Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1411. 222 Dan-Cohen, supra note 118, at 1237. 223 Id. at 1241. 224 Id.
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that are unique and irreplaceable are so simply because no one believes them! 
In the words of Meiklejohn, arguably the foremost proponent of a listener-oriented 
approach to the First Amendment, “What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that 
everything worth saying shall be said.”225 If a given instance of corporate speech is actually 
believed by its authors, they can be expected to repeat it in their own voice “outside of ... 
office hours”; so, there is no reason to think it will be lost226 if corporate speech is not 
protected.227 Conversely, if its authors would not it repeat in their own voice, it is unlikely to 
be something “worth saying.” 
 Such a formulation may raise alarms.  It is widely agreed that the First Amendment 
implies that it is not the role of government to judge what is worth saying;228 government 
should be as neutral as possible in allowing the free exchange of ideas.  But this principle 
need not extend to promoting ideas that aren’t anyone’s, that do not even aim at truth.229 
On any account of why speech may have value for listeners, untrue speech has less 
value: it does not contribute to listeners’ knowledge, nor does it provide a basis for informed 
decision-making.  Free speech protections extend to untrue speech as well, in part because 
 225 Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 26 (1960). 226 It has been argued, though, that an important message is lost when a corporation’s message is 
communicated by other parties:  “The message’s overall nature may change when the messenger 
changes.”  Redish & Wasserman, supra note 134, at 257.  “[T]he very fact that a major profitmaking 
corporation is of the opinion that ... a particular policy is important to the community’s prosperity 
may reasonably influence individual judgments on the matter.”  Id. at 248-49.  A first response is that 
corporations don’t have opinions; corporate statements that a given policy will benefit community 
prosperity should probably be understood as indicating corporate officers’ judgment that the policy 
would benefit that corporation’s prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the fact that corporate officers make that judgment itself may be useful 
information, as J. Scalia points out, in a more realistic version of the same argument: “Why should 
the Michigan voters ... be deprived of the information that private associations owning and operating 
a vast percentage of the industry of the State, and employing a large number of its citizens, believe 
that the election of a particular candidate is important to their prosperity?”  Austin, 494 U.S. at 694 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  But no one is proposing to deprive voters—or consumers—of such 
information.  To the contrary, one of the speech regulations challenged by corporations is precisely 
the requirement that they identify themselves when they sponsor messages. 227 It is true that if corporate speech is regulated, even those corporate utterances believed by those 
inside the corporation may end up less widely broadcast.  Critics complain that the messages in 
question are thereby muffled; it would be more accurate to say that they fail to receive special 
amplification not available to other messages, which may have at least as much value for listeners. 228 See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 
545). 229 I have already argued that, from a speaker standpoint, treating corporate speech differently is not 
discriminatory, because corporate speech is not the speech of any speaker.  I argue here that judging 
corporate speech to have less value for listeners likewise does not violate government neutrality.  
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penalizing false speech could chill debate—including true speech,230 and in part because 
government regulators are not trusted reliably to distinguish true from false speech.231 In 
addition, even false speech is taken to contribute to the social project of arriving at true, 
justified beliefs: the free exchange of ideas and arguments, including false ideas and unsound 
arguments, is supposed help us to sort out which ideas are true, and to strengthen the 
justification for our beliefs.232 But attributing this sort of value to false speech presupposes 
that most speech at least aims at truth.  Other perspectives are worth listening to and offer the 
possibility of learning from, insofar as they are the perspectives of other truth-seekers.  While 
it is often difficult to distinguish willfully false speech with sufficient reliability to regulate it, 
such speech does not contribute to the social pursuit of knowledge, and, where distinguish-
able, is not protected.233 
Corporate speech is a special case in that, as a class, it simply does not aim at truth.234 
It need not be willfully false, but it is advanced for reasons independent of its truth or falsity.  
As explained earlier, it is the fiduciary responsibility of the authors of corporate speech to 
decide its content, not on the basis of whether it is believed to be true, but on the basis of 
whether it is believed to serve the corporation’s financial interests.  For this reason, corporate 
speech does not contribute significantly to the social epistemic project. 
For comparison, imagine a complex computer algorithm capable of constructing 
coherent sentences, randomly generated.  Imagine further that it can put together sentences to 
construct arguments with some degree of facial plausibility—enough not to appear simply 
absurd, but otherwise without regard to the truth of any of the sentences.  It would be 
implausible to hold that listeners have a strong interest in receiving such strings of sentences, 
or that listeners’ rights would be violated if they were prevented them from receiving those 
strings.  Corporate speech is of similarly low value to listeners.  Although it may be more 
 230 E.g. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 
(1968); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72. 231 E.g. Riley, 487 U.S. at 791; Austin, 494 U.S. at 692-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 232 This last consideration was advanced in the nineteenth century by British philosopher John Stuart 
Mill, supra note 93, at ch. 2, and endorsed by the Supreme Court in Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279, fn. 19. 233 For example, it is uncontroversial that neither fraud nor deliberate libel—even of public figures—
is constitutionally protected.  Traditionally, there is less protection for classes of speech that are of 
particularly “slight social value as a step to truth.”  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942). 234 A similar point is made in Schneider, supra note 65, at 1259. 
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strategically oriented, it is similarly not truth-directed.  Granting the premise that government 
should be as neutral as possible in allowing the free exchange of ideas, to discriminate 
against speech that is not anyone’s is as principled and neutral as a TV station refusing to 
give equal time to broadcasting sentences randomly generated by computer.235 
If anything, classifying all corporate speech as commercial would entail less govern-
ment intrusion and less scope for government judgment about the merits of specific speech 
than is entailed by the case-specific inquiry called for under current doctrine into the content 
and context of specific instances of corporate speech that may or may not be commercial.  It 
may be countered that if the goal is to minimize intrusive government judgments about the 
value of various speech, that goal would better be served by ceasing to classify some speech 
as commercial and thereby worthy of lesser protection.236 But abandoning such classifica-
tions would not do away with the need to make comparable distinctions.  For example, in de-
fending their proposal to treat commercial speech like any other speech, Kozinski and Banner 
argue that doing so would not render unconstitutional statutes regulating consumer fraud and 
the like.237 But such statutes require government inquiry at least as intrusive as those called 
for under commercial speech doctrine into the content, context, consequences, and intent of 
various statements by commercial speakers.  
In summary, the claim that corporate speech embodies a unique message that would 
otherwise be lost is correct only when the message lacks credibility.  This judgment of cred-
 235 Several commentators have used other mechanistic images to illustrate the automatic nature of 
corporate speech, divorced from any person’s actual beliefs.  E.g. Bezanson, supra note 23, at 779 
(comparing the speech of the Chamber of Commerce in Austin to “a machine programmed in a 
general direction”); Greenwood, supra note 104, at 1029 (“we have created an institution for a 
specific purpose and put it on a sort of automatic pilot”); Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and 
Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society 46-49 (1986) (describing a thought-
experiment in which a corporation becomes ownerless by buying all its own stock, workerless by 
fully automating production, and managerless by programming sophisticated computers to make all 
business decisions, and then continues much as before). 
 Given sufficiently sophisticated programming and technology, Dan-Cohen’s personless 
corporation would continue to engage in product and political advertising.  The ensuing corporate 
speech would contribute as little to the social quest for knowledge as would the computer-generated 
sentence strings imagined supra. If the managers of an ordinary corporation are doing their job 
responsibly, the corporate speech they produce should be the equivalent of that produced by the 
computer-run corporation, and of equally low value to knowledge-seeking listeners. 236 As urged by, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 62; Kathleen Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, 
and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123 (1997); Redish, supra 
note 60. 237 Supra note 134, at 651-52. 
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ibility is not one made by a censoring government.  Rather, a message’s lack of credibility is 
demonstrated if no one chooses to advance it without being paid to do so.  Failure to protect 
messages that are “unique” in this way does not significantly infringe listener interests. 
In the remainder of this section I consider several further objections to the thesis that 
corporate speech has particularly low value for listeners. 
The argument that corporate speech has low value for listeners rests on the assump-
tion that the public pursuit of knowledge is advanced better when people argue for points of 
view they genuinely believe than when they seek reasons to support a point of view advanta-
geous to certain interests.  Against that assumption, it has been suggested that material 
incentives to promote a viewpoint serve to marshal the strongest arguments available for that 
viewpoint, allowing its strength to be tested against other viewpoints.238 Thus, for example, 
our legal system calls for attorneys to be hired to make the best possible case for each side, 
regardless of their own personal beliefs, in the expectation that the truth is most likely to 
emerge when opposing points of view are each zealously advocated. 
This counter-argument falls short.  First, the idea that truth will emerge from ‘zealous 
advocacy’ presupposes a two-sided dispute, in which both sides are represented.239 In the 
case of corporate speech, a few views are represented by paid advocates (often with large 
budgets for publicity), while countless other possible views are unrepresented.  Second, even 
the legal model does not call for unrestrained advocacy by each side.  To the contrary, the 
legal system aspires to an ideal of rational argumentation: rules of evidence are supposed to 
minimize the likelihood that jurors will be misled by prejudicial, confusing, or otherwise 
misleading arguments.240 Few comparable checks operate on corporate advertising.  For 
these reasons, it is implausible that zealous advocacy by corporate spokespersons serves as 
part of a process likely to enlighten listeners. 
A different sort of objection can be derived from several Supreme Court dissents, 
 238 E.g. id. at 258, 262, and 269-71. 239 The importance of the requirement that both sides get at least some representation is illustrated by 
the fact that representation is a constitutional right for criminal defendants facing serious 
consequences.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  One of the most widely recognized 
problems facing our legal system is that legal adversaries are often unequally represented, because of 
unequal resources, raising concerns that truth is less likely to prevail. 240 See Farber, supra note 60, at 402. 
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according to which corporate political speech, contrary to the thesis of this section, has 
particularly high value: “Corporations, after all, are the engines of our modern economy.  
They facilitate complex operations on which the Nation’s prosperity depends.  To say these 
entities cannot alert the public to pending political issues that may threaten the country’s 
economic interests is unprecedented.”241 In contrast to views according to which corporate 
voices should be regulated to curb the excessive influence of corporations, on this view 
corporate voices are of particular interest to potential listeners precisely because of their 
influence. 
While such arguments have some superficial plausibility, on reflection it is not clear 
what special “information” listeners are supposed to receive from corporations.  It might be 
informative to hear the candid thoughts of an experienced corporate executive about the 
expected effects of various policies.  But such speakers do not have difficulty finding fora in 
which to broadcast their views widely.  There is no reason to suppose that the official 
position of some corporation on such issues would be similarly informative.  That position is 
likely to consist principally of predictable communications serving the short-term interests of 
that corporation as judged by those who set its policies. 
Intertwined with the foregoing sort of arguments, one sometimes finds the argument 
that it is particularly important to safeguard the voices of powerful non-government entities, 
because they are uniquely able to serve as checks on government power.  As Redish and 
Wasserman put it, “To eliminate voluntary associations—not only including powerful ones, 
but especially including powerful ones—from public debate is … to augment the always 
dominant power of government.”242 
This defense of corporate speech points to a fundamental theoretical disagreement 
underlying many legal debates, including those about campaign finance reform, media 
regulation, and government regulation of business in general.  The viewpoint represented by 
Redish and Wasserman sees central government as the principal threat to individual liberty in 
today’s United States.  Just as the constitutional scheme seeks to safeguard individual liberty 
 241 McConnell, 124 S.Ct at 772 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). See also id. at 725-26 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting in part); Austin, 494 U.S. at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 242 Redish & Wasserman, supra note 134, at 248 (emphasis in original). 
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by separating government power between several branches, and between federal and state 
levels, that can curb each others’ excesses, so, on this view, individual liberty is similarly 
protected by the existence of private organizations powerful enough to serve as meaningful 
checks on government.243 As in 18th-century Europe, limiting the rights of aristocrats and 
wealthy bourgeois would not have empowered the people, but would have solidified the 
autocratic power of the king, so limiting the voices of wealthy individuals or powerful 
businesses today would weaken the only elements of society powerful enough to check the 
natural tendency of government toward tyranny. 
The opposing view sees government in the contemporary United States not so much 
as an independent center of power, like an 18th-century king, but as an apparatus for exer-
cising power, control of which is contested among various parties, but which is captured 
largely—and always in danger of further capture—by large for-profit corporations.  The task 
for protectors of liberty on this view is not so much limiting government power, as limiting 
the control of government by the most powerful elements of society—large for-profit 
corporations.   
It is far beyond the scope of this essay to advance this long-standing debate.  But to 
the extent that corporations are analogized to another branch of government (one neither 
elected nor required to serve the public interest), it is anomalous to claim free speech rights 
for them on this basis.244 The First Amendment does not protect government speech; it 
protects against government power. 
III. OBJECTIONS 
A. Does Treating Corporate Speech Differently Distort Debate Unfairly? 
Probably the most prevalent argument245 in favor of extending broad First Amend-
ment rights to corporations is that it is unfair to apply less protective standards to corporate 
speech, particularly in a debate between corporations and other speakers, as when Nike re-
 243 See id. at 263-64; McConnell, 124 S.Ct at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 244 Cf. Greenwood, supra note 23, at 999 (are corporations “similar to the government itself, a tool 
that constantly threatens to control us instead of being controlled by us, which we should have rights 
against and not vice versa?”). 245 This argument was raised frequently regarding the Nike litigation.  E.g. Nike, 123 S.Ct. at 2567 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Kasky, 45 P.3d at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting); id. at 273 (Brown, J., dissenting); 
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16-17, Nike, U.S. S.Ct. (no. 02-575). 
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sponded to accusations that many of its products were made under sweatshop conditions.  
That argument goes something like this: critics of Nike are highly protected by the First Am-
endment.  According to the doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan246 and its progeny, 
purveyors of false criticisms of Nike could be liable for defamation only if it could be shown 
that they knew their criticisms were untrue or that they published them with reckless disre-
gard for whether they were true,247 a standard known as “actual malice,”248 or subsequently 
as “New York Times malice.”249 Meanwhile, Nike was sued under California unfair compet-
ition250 and false advertising251 laws, according to which it could be liable for any false state-
ment, however inadvertent.  Thus, if such statutes were found constitutional, one side of the 
debate is inhibited by facing a much lower threshold for liability than the other.  This dispar-
ity is supposed to distort public debate by unfairly tilting the playing field against Nike. 
This charge of unfairness could be understood in several ways: as unfairness to 
certain speakers, as unfairness to Nike itself, or as detriment to the public’s interest in open, 
fair debate on matters of public concern. 
The first version of the charge can readily dismissed.  If I am right that a corporation 
cannot be presumed to speak for its shareholders or any other constituency, then there are no 
speakers treated unfairly by restrictions on Nike’s speech. 
The suggestion that there might be some unfairness to Nike itself can be dismissed 
almost as quickly.  Nike is a commercial corporation.  The only interests it has are 
commercial.  The only harms it can suffer are commercial.  The only harm that Nike 
shareholders can suffer from harm to Nike is that their Nike investments lose value, not 
harms relating to their First Amendment rights. 
The same asymmetry deplored with respect to debates about overseas sweatshop 
conditions applies to debates about matters that are uncontroversially commercial.  It is 
 246 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 247 Sullivan held that such a high threshold was required for liability for defamation of “public 
officials” to prevent public debate about matters of public concern from being chilled by fear of 
liability for inadvertent falsehoods.  Id. at 271, 279.  The same standard was held to apply in actions 
for defamation against “public figures” generally in Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.  Nike Corp. counts as a 
public figure. 248 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. 249 E.g. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15 (1990). 250 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.251 §§ 17500 et seq. 
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settled doctrine that Nike may constitutionally be held liable, under any reasonable standard a 
legislature may impose—including strict liability, for false statements in its traditional 
commercial advertising, e.g., statements about price or product quality.  But when a 
noncommercial speaker, such as Consumer Reports, falsely presents Nike’s products or 
prices in an unfavorable light, it too is entitled to the heightened protections of Sullivan.252 
As Nike Corp. has no non-commercial interest in the ideas it propounds, there is no reason to 
distinguish the two scenarios in terms of unfairness to Nike. 
These asymmetries in the law of liability are reasonable.  They may be justified in 
part on the ground that a business may be expected to be in a better position than other 
parties to verify claims about its own products and operations. The public interest in 
receiving reliable commercial information may be served best by a legal regime that allows 
more room for error to disinterested purveyors of such information, in order to avoid chilling 
their contribution. 
In any event, there is nothing unfair to Nike or its shareholders in such asymmetries.  
Any disadvantage to Nike is shared by the businesses with which it competes for market 
share.  Any burden to the industry as a whole fails to make such laws constitutionally more 
problematic than any other commercial regulation that may impose some costs on business 
for the benefit of the public.  The fact that the legal regulations have to do with speech does 
not make them more unfair to Nike, as Nike itself has no speaker interests. 
So, if the alleged difference in standards for liability between Nike and its critics has 
any First Amendment import, that import must be understood in terms of the public’s interest 
in open, fair debate of issues of public concern,253 i.e., in terms of listener interests.  In fact 
any supposed asymmetry is illusory.  The debate supposedly stacked against Nike is 
commonly characterized as one between Nike and opponents of globalization. But that 
characterization is misleading.  Opponents of globalization are for the most part disinterested 
parties.  The plaintiff against Nike was simply a concerned citizen, bringing suit under the 
 252 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 253 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting) (“Handicapping one side in this important 
worldwide debate is both ill considered and unconstitutional.  Full free speech protection for one side 
and strict liability for the other will hardly promote vigorous and meaningful debate”) (internal 
citations omitted); Nike, 123 S.Ct. at 2567 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
54
now-repealed ‘citizen attorney general’ provision of California’s fair business practices 
laws.254 His First Amendment rights should be compared to the rights of disinterested 
defenders of Nike’s practices, not to Nike’s rights.  Nike’s own speech protections are more 
properly compared to those of interested parties on the other side—in that case, the Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and Indonesian workers, most of them women under age 24,255 who make 
Nike’s shoes.  On either of these fairer characterizations of the debate, it is clear that the 
playing field is not tilted against Nike. 
The idea that Nike’s voice needs to be protected to ensure that the public interest in 
fair debate is not impeded is ludicrous on its face.  To listen to advocates of Nike’s right to 
speak, one would think that the U.S. airwaves were dominated by the voices of Nike’s 
overseas laborers, while Nike was unable to receive a hearing.  The courts’ formalist 
approach to the First Amendment is supposed to prohibit consideration of such realities as 
the inability of Asian sweatshop workers to compete for the ear of the American public 
against Nike’s billion dollar budget for public relations.256 I argue first that such formalism 
is misplaced when no speaker interests are threatened, and second that, even from a formalist 
perspective, it is incorrect that treating its speech as commercial would disadvantage Nike. 
The Court’s refusal to take speakers’ actual resources into account makes sense only 
insofar as it is based on concern for speaker rights that might be impaired by restrictions on 
the ability of those with greater resources to dominate debate.257 Such concerns do not apply 
to corporate speech, where no speaker rights are at stake.  If one is to take seriously the 
official view that listeners’ principal interest in “robust debate on matters of public concern” 
is to allow them to reach an informed judgment about the disputed issues, then the ideal 
debate, from the standpoint of listeners, would be one in which all views get an equal chance 
to be heard.  That ideal may not be achievable, nor even fully coherent—how many 
 254 California’s unfair business and false advertising statutes were amended by voter initiative (Calif-
ornia Prop. 64) in 2004 to prohibit suits by plaintiffs who did not plead any injury to themselves.  
Notes and Comments, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203, 17204, 17206, 17535, 17536 (West 2005). 255 Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 947. 256 In 1997 Nike reported annual expenditures for advertising and marketing of almost $1 billion.  
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247. 257 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. 49, fn. 55 (rejecting “position that the First Amendment permits 
Congress to abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in order to enhance 
the relative voice of other segments of our society”). 
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viewpoints are there, and what counts as a viewpoint that should be heard?  Still, where 
concerns about violating speaker rights are absent, there is no reason for First Amendment 
jurisprudence not to consider inequality in actual ability to be heard. 
 Courts have been sensitive to such considerations in the context of traditional 
broadcast media, where the limited number of broadcast frequencies available has the 
consequence that more speech for one speaker literally means less speech for another.258 But 
the following statement applies equally in other contexts: 
[N]ot all free speakers have equally loud voices, and success in the 
marketplace of ideas may go to the advocate who can shout loudest or 
most often. Debate … in which only one party has the financial 
resources and interest to purchase sustained access to the mass 
communications media is not a fair test of either an argument's truth or 
its innate popular appeal. ... [W]here ... one party to a debate has a 
financial clout and a compelling economic interest in the presentation 
of one side unmatched by its opponent, ... the purpose of rugged 
debate is served, not hindered, by an attempt to redress the balance.259 
Courts have occasionally recognized similar considerations in non-broadcast contexts.  One 
of the reasons for requiring a more stringent standard for liability for defamation of public 
figures than of private figures was that the former “usually enjoy significantly greater access 
to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements.”260 Conversely, the Court declined to extend this higher level of 
protection to a credit report, on the ground that it did not require “special protection to 
ensure” robust debate on public issues.261 The same could well be said of Nike’s speech.  
After all, the disparity in resources between Nike and its overseas workers is not a 
contingency of a particular case, but reflects a pattern to be expected in disputes between 
corporations and people—the very point of incorporation is to concentrate more capital than 
would otherwise be possible.  
Even from a formalist perspective, treating Nike’s speech as commercial would not 
tilt the conditions of debate against Nike.  Recall that the interested parties on the other side 
of this debate—the workers whose working conditions were at issue—were not U.S. citizens, 
 258 Notably in Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367, discussed supra sec. IIC1. 259 Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1102-03 (Bazelon, J.) (upholding F.C.C. regulation requiring radio and 
television stations carrying cigarette advertising also to give air time to anti-smoking broadcasts). 260 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 261 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. 
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and consequently were not protected by the First Amendment, except for the limited 
protection provided for the benefit of listener interests.262 That level of protection applies to 
Nike’s statements as well, even if they are classified as commercial speech.  Moreover, 
corporations have the formal advantage of limited liability: a corporation such as Nike could 
use undercapitalized subsidiaries to put forward questionable claims, while insulating the 
parent corporation from liability.263 
It is true that anti-Nike viewpoints could also be represented by many U.S. citizens, 
with full speaker rights under the First Amendment, including organizations whose principal 
purpose is to oppose globalization.  That brings us to the second fair way to characterize the 
debate.  The First Amendment rights of disinterested critics of Nike should be compared not 
to those of Nike, but to those of disinterested defenders of Nike’s position.  Disinterested 
parties wishing to defend globalization in general or Nike’s overseas labor practices in 
particular can do so on the same terms as opponents of either.  If anything distorts the debate 
it is the special amplification that corporate support makes possible for certain voices.264 
The idea that subjecting Nike’s corporate speech to easier standards for liability 
impairs one side of the debate appears plausible only because it is implicitly assumed that no 
one else would represent Nike’s side of the debate, i.e., Nike’s position is too bankrupt—
intellectually or morally—to be defended by anyone not paid to do so.  In short, the ‘tilted 
playing field’ objection is simply a variant of the ‘unique corporate voices will be lost’ 
objection, and the same response applies: holding corporate speech to a higher standard 
 262 See Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, discussed supra sec. IIC1.  Granted, this point would not apply in a 
dispute between a domestic corporation and domestic workers.  But the value for listeners of hearing 
opposing points of view does not depend on the nationality of the speaker.  Nike’s legal advantage 
vis-à-vis foreign the speech of foreign workers distorts debate at least as much any alleged 
disadvantage it might face against domestic workers. 263 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 711-12 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 264 A similar point is sometimes couched in terms of the “special advantages extended by the State” to 
corporations.  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting); see also William Patton & Randall 
Bartlett, Corporate ‘Persons’ and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 
Wis. L. Rev. 494, 498 (1981) (“To permit unrestricted corporate speech is to grant to certain individ-
uals a special state-created mechanism for speaking”).  But the claim of distortion does not depend on 
the claim that corporations’ ability to concentrate wealth depends on any special concession from the 
state, but only on recognizing that “[r]ather than a group of citizens, a corporation must be understood 
as a pot of money.”  Greenwood, supra note 23, at 1054.  If the norm for free debate is a situation in 
which everyone voices her views to the extent that she is able and cares to, then debate is distorted 
when this pot of money is thrown behind one voice without regard to anyone’s belief that the view-
point expressed has any merit beyond serving a corporation’s financial interest. 
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neither infringes on the rights of any speaker nor interferes with the desired outcome that 
“everything worth saying shall be said.”265 
B. Drawing Lines Between Corporate and More Protected Speech 
Even if it seems plausible that no speech by business corporations has any claim to 
greater protection than commercial speech, it may be questioned whether it is possible to 
draw a principled distinction between organizations that should be treated as commercial for 
First Amendment purposes and those that should not.  If the foregoing analysis is correct, the 
crucial question on which to base such distinctions is whether the speech of the organization 
implicates non-economic speaker interests.  We have already seen that corporate form is not 
enough on which to base a distinction: advocacy organizations with corporate form do 
implicate speaker interests.  The distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit corporations 
may likewise be insufficient: Austin suggests that some not-for-profit corporations do not im-
plicate speaker interests.  Inversely, the New York Times Company is a for-profit 
corporation, but it is not plausible that all speech by the New York Times should be treated 
as commercial speech.  Some non-press business corporations may have an ideological 
character that makes one hesitate to characterize all their speech as purely commercial either.  
And if the contrast between utilitarian organizations and those that represent expressive 
interests is crucial, how are labor unions to be classified?  A different kind of line-drawing 
problem concerns which speech should be attributed to the organization.  When is the public 
speech of a corporate manager her own, entitled to the highest level of First Amendment 
protection, and when is it corporate speech?  In this section I attempt to show that principled 
answers are available to such questions.  While there may be difficult borderline cases, the 
judgments called for will be similar to judgments that courts already need to make. 
 265 A related pragmatic objection has been raised against holding corporations liable for false state-
ments: that the threat of liability might deter corporations from addressing such ‘social responsibility’ 
concerns as their overseas labor practices.  E.g. Nike, 123 S.Ct. at 2568 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  But it 
is not clear how much is lost by a decline in corporate communications on social issues, when those 
communications include substantial falsehoods.  The argument that fear of liability for inadvertent 
misstatements will result in a reduction of truthful disclosures is dubious: it should not be difficult for 
Nike to verify straightforward claims about its own rates of pay and working conditions.  At most, 
this consideration supports applying a negligence standard rather than a strict liability standard to 
Nike’s false statements; it does not justify requiring an “actual malice” standard.  In any event, if 
consumer demand is not sufficient to elicit reports from corporations on their social practices, there 
are no constitutional obstacles to requiring Nike to make such information public. 
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1. Non-profit advocacy organizations. Little more needs to be said here.  As argued 
earlier, because members join advocacy organizations to broadcast their beliefs, regulation of 
such an organization’s speech infringes members’ speaker interests.  In contrast, corporate 
speech is not a broadcasting of anyone’s beliefs, nor is it intended to be. 
The point is not that corporate speech is necessarily the speech of an agent, that there 
is unlikely to be unanimity of viewpoint among members (shareholders), or that an agent 
may execute his fiduciary responsibilities imperfectly.  All of this is true of advocacy 
organizations as well.  The key contrast is that the fiduciary responsibility of a spokesperson 
for an advocacy organization is to express, as best as possible, the beliefs of its membership.  
A corporate spokesperson has no corresponding responsibility to express the beliefs of 
shareholders or any constituency.  Her responsibility is to issue those communications she 
judges to be in the best economic interests of the organization. 
Distinguishing between for-profit and non-profit corporations may often roughly 
track the distinction at issue, but it does so imperfectly.  The crucial distinction is that 
between “expressive” and “utilitarian” organization, in Dan-Cohen’s terminology,266 where 
an expressive organization is one whose speech is intended to represent the views of its 
members.  Some non-profit corporations may fall on the non-expressive side of the divide, as 
the Supreme Court found with respect to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce in Austin.267 
(It is relevant, though, that the Chamber of Commerce could be viewed as largely represent-
ing for-profit corporations.268)
Distinguishing between utilitarian and expressive organizations does not prevent any 
novel practical difficulties.  Courts already need to draw such distinctions in the context of 
campaign finance regulation,269 and in deciding whether an association is sufficiently 
expressive that it may legally discriminate against protected categories in its membership or 
employment practices.270 
266 Supra note 118, at 1244-50. 267 494 U.S. at 661-63. 268 The Austin Court considered this a significant factor in favor of treating the Chamber as akin to a 
business firm.  494 U.S. at 664. 269 Discussed supra sec. IIB1. 270 See Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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2. Business organizations with a social agenda. Some businesses might be 
established specifically for the purpose of promoting some political or social agenda.  For 
example, anti-globalization activists might establish a business for the purpose of 
demonstrating non-exploitative approaches to international trade.  What then if such a 
business is set up as a for-profit corporation?  It could even be marketed in such a way that 
its investors share the political/social goals of the organizers.  In such a case, organizational 
speech might well implicate speaker interests, and therefore the rationale for treating 
corporate speech as commercial seems less applicable. 
In practice, however, it could be difficult to distinguish such ‘advocacy businesses.’  
Almost any corporation could recast its mission in terms of some social agenda.  Nike could 
maintain that its use of Asian contractors was intended to demonstrate the benefits of 
globalization, while another corporation could maintain that it intended to demonstrate the 
social benefits of relying on domestic manufacturing.  Higher protection for the speech of 
business corporations with a social agenda would require intrusive inquiry and potentially 
arbitrary judgments as to the motivations of entrepreneurs and investors.  On the other hand, 
not distinguishing ‘advocacy businesses’ risks failing to accord higher protection to some 
speech that does implicate speaker interests. 
One solution might be to treat speech by for-profit corporations as commercial in 
general, but allow an exception for corporations whose articles of incorporation expressly 
allowed profit-maximizing to be balanced against some other stated social or political 
corporate goal.  Particular speech by such a corporation could be classified as commercial or 
not, according to the standards currently used to decide whether speech is commercial, 
without the presumption that all its speech is commercial (unless perhaps a court finds 
pretextual the stated alternative corporate objectives). 
If the foregoing proposal proves unfeasible, it would be acceptable to treat all speech 
by for-profit corporations with social agendas as commercial.  If the principal differences in 
treatment for commercial speech concern greater accountability for false statements about a 
business’ own practices or products, and greater leeway for compelling information about 
those, then why not hold corporations-with-social-agendas to the same standard?  It may 
60
seem odd to suggest that when anti-globalization activists criticize Nike, their speech should 
be highly protected, but that when they form an alternative business, the same speech should 
become less protected.  But it must be remembered that those same activists lose no 
protection for criticisms of Nike in their own voice.  Their rights are not infringed if their use 
of corporate funds to this end does not receive the same level of protection. 
It would seem, however, that at least one class of publicly traded for profit 
corporations needs to be treated differently—the press. 
3. The press. The New York Times Company, like many news companies, is a 
publicly traded for-profit corporation.  If the thesis that all corporate speech is commercial 
entailed that anything published in the Times is commercial speech, that would count heavily 
against the thesis.  But that inference can be resisted on several grounds. 
A principled distinction can be drawn between speech of the New York Times 
Company and speech in the New York Times.  The former is speech that is part of doing 
business, like the speech of any other business.  When the company makes representations to 
potential subscribers about the reliability of its delivery services, or to distributors, suppliers, 
or workers about benefits, there is no reason those representations should receive higher 
protection than does analogous commercial speech by any other corporation.271 The same 
should be true of company representations to the public about how well it treats its employ-
ees, suppliers, or the environment.  In contrast, published articles or opinion pieces may more 
properly be viewed as speech of their respective authors than as speech of the New York 
Times Company.272 Even unsigned editorials may be taken to be the speech of the editorial 
staff.  At any rate, they are not ordinary business speech, but the product of the particular 
business.  Crucially, the earlier arguments of this paper do not apply to them: unlike the 
speech of the New York Times Company, there is no fiduciary obligation that editorials 
maximize the profitability of the company (even if there may be pressures in that direction).  
 271 One of the reasons for according commercial speech lesser protection is that “the State’s interest in 
regulating the underlying transaction may give it a concomitant interest in the expression itself.”  
Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.  Press companies can be regulated like any other business with respect to 
their business affairs.  Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 397 (Douglas, J., dissenting, citing Associated 
Press, 326 U.S. 1.  It follows that speech that is part of a press’s business affairs is commercial speech 
like any other. 272 See Greenwood, supra note 23, at 1057-58. 
61
An alternative approach could find in the free press clause of the First Amendment a 
principled reason for treating the press differently.273 Given that it has always been accepted 
that the free speech clause protects written publications of all sorts, the press clause is in dan-
ger of appearing redundant, unless it is understood to provide some particular protection for 
the press.274 Such an approach is in keeping with longstanding jurisprudence recognizing the 
unique role of the press as a check on government misconduct.275 There is precedent for 
singling out the press for special protection: campaign finance laws often explicitly exempt 
media companies from restrictions on corporate spending and contributions.276 The Court 
has found usually found those exemptions unproblematic.277 
What then if the Nike Corporation starts its own newspaper, disseminating misleading 
statements about its products or its overseas business practices, and then claims that it would 
violate freedom of the press to treat those statements as commercial speech?  Or what if Nike 
simply buys the New York Times to the same end?  If the parent company merely creates or 
allows a perception that favorable publicity for Nike will lead to reporters’ and editors’ 
professional advancement, the result may not differ much from the situation at many actual 
newspapers and broadcast companies.  Unfortunate as it may be, the speech of reporters and 
editors may often be influenced by external pressures; such pressures are not enough to make 
the resulting speech that of the company, rather than of the individual speaker.  On the other 
hand, if the parent company orders specific content about its own practices—analogous to 
Nike’s ‘press releases’—to be published in its newspaper, it might be reasonable to treat such 
content as the speech of the parent company.  One can imagine a spectrum of intermediate 
cases, in which the parent company doesn’t dictate specific content, but orders its business 
practices to be featured prominently and favorably.  But the possibility of difficult borderline 
 273 See C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 819, 824; Bezanson, supra note 23, at 808-09. 274 Although one former Justice argued that the press clause confers special protections on the press, 
Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975), the Court has never officially endorsed 
or rejected this view.  See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 798 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 275 E.g. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Martin, 319 U.S. at 143 fn. 3 (1943) (quoting 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 276 E.g. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(i); § 431(9)(B)(i). 277 E.g. McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at 697-98; Austin, 494 U.S. at 668.  Such exemptions have been 
questioned, however, in McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at  742-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part); id. at 740-
41 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51, fn. 56; and Belotti, 435 U.S. at 796 
(Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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cases should not obscure the fact that the distinction between speech of the press and 
ordinary business speech of a parent corporation will be quite clear in most cases. 
Where there are difficult cases near the borders, those difficulties should be no greater 
than in other contexts in which courts have had to distinguish between genuine press publica-
tions and commercial—or other—activity that may be more closely regulated.  For example, 
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act (BCRA) of 2002, exempts news reports and editorials in newspapers and broad-
casts by independent media companies from various regulations, but excludes newspapers or 
broadcast companies controlled by candidates or political parties from the exemptions.278 
The Investment Advisors Act prohibits professionals who are not registered investment 
advisors from giving investment advice by people, but excludes from this prohibition “the 
publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of 
general and regular circulation.”279 Likewise, news stories are exempted from the 
requirement that broadcasters provide equal time to candidates for public office.280 To 
enforce any of these statutes, courts must distinguish bona fide, independent press from 
campaign newsletters, investment newsletters, and the like, requiring judgments analogous to 
those that would be required to determine whether an article appearing in a Nike-owned 
newspaper is a bona fide news article or Nike’s corporate speech.281 In fact such distinctions 
could be needed even in conventional commercial speech cases.  If a newspaper editorialized 
in favor of a transaction in which it had an economic interest, that would presumably not be 
commercial speech, while the same content in a non-newspaper format would be.282 
Judicial analyses in those other contexts could serve as starting points for distinguish-
ing press speech from corporate speech in close cases.  For example, in applying the press 
exemption to the Investment Advisers Act, the Supreme Court has reasoned that “a ‘bona 
 278 E.g. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2004); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2004). 279 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (2004). 280 See McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at 698. 281 For example, in deciding whether certain publications qualify for the press exemption from 
campaign finance regulations, courts have asked “whether the press entity was acting as a press entity 
in making the distribution complained of.”  Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. F.E.C., 509 F. Supp. 1210, 
1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 282 Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90
Yale L. J. 1833, 1859 (1981). 
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fide’ publication would be genuine in the sense that it would contain disinterested 
commentary and analysis as opposed to promotional material.”283 The publications in 
question in that case were found to fall under the exclusion, in part because “they are 
published by those engaged solely in the publishing business and are not personal 
communications masquerading in the clothing of newspapers, news magazines, or financial 
publications.  Moreover, there is no suggestion that they contained any false or misleading 
information, or that they were designed to tout any security in which petitioners had an 
interest.”284 Drawing on this precedent, the D.C. Circuit held in another case that 
“presentation of articles as objective reporting, if in fact the articles are paid for by the 
company featured, would be inherently misleading,” and so, would not fall under the bona 
fide press exemption.285 Distinguishing a genuine newspaper from an outlet for corporate 
publicity could be guided by similar criteria, and should prove no more difficult.286 
4. Labor unions. It is less clear where labor unions fit in a scheme that distinguishes 
expressive organizations from utilitarian ones. In recent decades, campaign finance law has 
tended to treat corporations and unions the same,287 though it has sometimes been suggested 
that restrictions on corporations’ election-related expenditures and contributions are more 
problematic than identical restrictions on unions.288 
283 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 206 (1985). 284 Id. at 209. 285 SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 286 Greenwood, supra note 23, at 1060-61, proposes a simple test: when a corporation pays to have 
speech disseminated, it is presumptively corporate speech; when the corporation receives payment for 
speech, it is presumptively the speech of human authors. 287 Both FECA, as amended in 1974, and RCRA treat corporations and unions alike with respect to 
campaign-related expenditures and contributions.  For an overview of FECA rules concerning unions 
and corporations, see James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An 
Introduction, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 1057, 1063 (2002).  For an overview of RCRA rules concerning unions 
and corporations, see id. at 1071-71; Erwin Chemerinsky, Five Justices Hold Firm on ‘Soft’ 
Campaign Money, 40-MAR Trial 78, 81 (2004). 
 The courts have likewise analyzed corporate and union political spending similarly.  Using 
union funds, from mandatory dues, to support political candidates and fund unrelated political speech 
was held to amount to coerced speech, violating the First Amendment rights of dissident union 
members, Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35; see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 
(1961), just as restrictions on corporate political speech were later held to protect shareholders who 
might disagree with the speech.  Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 208; Beaumont, 123 S.Ct. 
at 2211 (both treating corporate and union speech alike). 288 E.g. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 134, at 275-76; Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political 
Speech, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109, 139-40 (1992).  First Amendment rights of dissenting union 
members are supposed to require greater protection than those of dissenting shareholders, because it 
is easier for a shareholder than for a union member to escape from financing political speech to which 
she objects: the shareholder can simply sell her shares, whereas the union member may have to give 
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In fact, however, while a principal purpose of unions may be to look out for the 
economic interests of their members, unions also serve as vehicles for political expression, in 
ways that ordinary for-profit corporations do not.  Various contrasts between unions and 
corporations reflect this difference.289 Union members are generally more involved in 
organizational decision-making than are shareholders of a publicly traded corporation.  Many 
important decisions in large unions are made at the local level.  Union leaders are elected, 
and many major questions are decided by vote, in a one person-one vote system.  In contrast, 
while in theory shareholders elect directors and can present resolutions on corporate policy at 
annual meetings, they have unequal voting rights, many shares are controlled by institutional 
investors or holding companies, and they have little authority over directors.290 Union 
members are also likely to identify with their roles as union members more than shareholders 
identify with theirs, as illustrated by the unlikelihood of finding groups of shareholders 
engaged in the cheering or chanting that can be found at union rallies or pickets. 
Unions should probably be viewed as hybrids of utilitarian and expressive 
organizations.  A union is most like an expressive organization in the early stages of union 
organizing, when it is similar to any other group seeking to vindicate rights or effect social or 
political change.  It becomes more like a utilitarian organization as it becomes institutional-
ized, e.g., after it becomes recognized as an official bargaining representative, especially 
where union membership becomes a condition of employment. 
Political speech by such an established union might be tantamount to coerced speech 
by members who disagree but are required to pay dues.  Therefore, it may be inappropriate to 
treat all union speech simply as collective advocacy speech.  At the same time, unlike corpor-
ate political speech, much union political speech does implicate speaker interests.  Therefore, 
union speech cannot all be classified as commercial speech either.  Just how union political 
speech should be treated under the First Amendment is a difficult question, but it does not 
point to any difficulties regarding how to treat corporate political speech. 
 
up his job.  See also Austin, 494 U.S. at 709-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (drawing similar contrast 
between members of non-profit corporations and union members). 289 Some of these differences are alluded to in Schneider, supra note 65, at 1263; Brudney, supra note 
23, at 292-93; Baker, supra note 11, at 656, fn. 35. 290 Regarding how little power shareholder voting exercises, see Greenwood, supra note 104, at 1039-
40; Joo, supra note 73, at 42-46. 
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5. Other forms of business organization. Does the argument that corporate speech 
does not implicate speaker interests extend to other forms of business organization?  It does 
not apply to sole proprietorships, where there is no meaningful difference between speech of 
the proprietorship and speech of the proprietor.  Whether a statement by a business proprietor 
is commercial speech would depend on the content and context of the statement in question.   
In partnerships or closely held corporations, there is some distinction between the speech of 
the organization and the speech of associated parties.  But to the extent that investor-owners 
have more direct involvement in and control over what the business does, it is less clear that 
no speaker interests are implicated by the business’ speech.  Therefore, it may not be approp-
riate to treat all speech by a partnership or closely held corporation as commercial speech. 
6. Individual speech by corporate officials. The line-drawing questions examined so 
far concern distinctions between corporations and other organizations whose speech might 
merit a higher level of protection.  A different sort of line-drawing problem arises in disting-
uishing corporate speech from speech by corporate spokespersons in their own voice.  In 
order to treat all corporate speech as commercial without infringing on the rights of corporate 
managers and other spokespersons to broadcast their own views, courts must be able to 
determine when the public comments of an executive about her company are the company’s 
speech, and hence commercial, and when they are simply her own personal views. 
Again, whatever difficulty may arise in deciding close cases, the legal questions here 
are no different from those that arise standardly in other contexts.  For example, when 
liability attaches to speech by a corporate officer, courts need to decide whether the speech is 
that of the corporation to determine whether the corporation should be held liable.  More 
generally, the question of whether a corporate officer is speaking for the corporation or 
herself is the familiar question of whether she is acting as a corporate agent, and a wide body 
of agency law is available to address it.  Relevant factors include whether the speech is 
within the scope of the corporate officer’s duties, perhaps whether it would reasonably be 
taken by listeners to represent the corporate view, and who pays for the speech.  If the speech 
is specifically paid for by the corporation, that would be strong evidence that it is corporate 
speech.  If it is not directly paid for, one might still ask whether it is supported by corporate 
66
resources, as when a corporate jet is used to fly an officer to deliver a speech, or when 
corporate staff, as part of their work responsibilities, help to draft or research a speech. 
The analysis required is no different from that required in applying commercial 
speech doctrine currently.  For example, when a company officer publicly makes false claims 
about the company’s products, such that those claims would uncontroversially be commercial 
speech if attributed to the company, they would not necessarily be commercial if they are 
expressions of his own views, unconnected to the company’s marketing. 
In summary, none of the putative difficulties in distinguishing commercial corpora-
tions from organizations whose speech should be more protected, or in distinguishing corpor-
ate speech from individual speech, constitute significant objections to the proposal that cor-
porate speech be treated as commercial.  There are principled grounds for distinguishing 
other sorts of organizations. Close cases will be decidable according to criteria that courts 
already rely on for other purposes.  Reduced protections for the speech of commercial 
corporations need not imply reduced protections for speech by the press, advocacy 
organizations, or even unions, nor for the speech of corporate managers or employees in their 
own voice. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that, because it is not an exercise of the speaker rights of any person, 
speech by a publicly traded commercial corporation is entitled to no more constitutional 
protection than (at most) that accorded commercial speech.  I have not considered whether or 
to what extent constitutionally permissible regulation of corporate speech is desirable as a 
matter of policy.  Nor have I examined the limits of what regulation is constitutionally 
permissible, i.e., what is the minimal level of protection constitutionally required for 
corporate speech—or commercial speech generally.  It follows from my argument that 
corporations could constitutionally be held liable for false statements about any topic on a 
lesser showing than New York Times malice.  The argument leaves open, however, whether 
strict liability, as per the California statutes under which Nike was sued, is constitutional, or 
whether some intermediate standard, such as negligence, is required by the First Amendment.  
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It also leaves open whether the First Amendment limits the severity of the penalties that may 
be imposed for false statements by corporations. 
But if it is correct that no rights in a strong sense are implicated in corporate speech, it 
might be reasonable to conclude that there are no constitutional limits on penalties or liability 
standards, provided only that the regulatory and punitive regime may reasonably be judged to 
serve the public interest.  The same may be true concerning the still more controversial 
question of when (or whether) true speech advocating legal activity may constitutionally be 
regulated or suppressed.  Alternatively, penalties for false speech and regulation of truthful 
speech could be thought to be justified only if they can reasonably be judged to serve general 
First Amendment interests in free discussion more than they hinder them.  (And some will 
argue that regulations of truthful speech advocating lawful activity never do so.)  But at any 
rate, it follows that weighing corporations’ speaker interests against the First Amendment 
interests of other parties is misconceived, as is the principle that it is illegitimate to silence 
corporate voices so that other voices may be heard.  Because corporate speech vindicates no 
one’s expressive interests, restrictions can in principle be justified by showing that listener 
interests will be benefited more than they will be harmed. 
I have argued that commercial speech doctrine should take notice of developments in 
First Amendment law regarding campaign finance regulation.  But the implications of 
making the connections run in both directions.  In particular, the conclusion that all corporate 
speech is commercial implies that, contrary to Bellotti, Austin, and McConnell,291 regulation 
of corporate election-related expenditures may be subjected to less than strict scrutiny. 
The arguments of this paper are not just of theoretical interest, but are arguments that 
could prevail in court.  They have proceeded from within the existing framework of First 
Amendment law, extrapolating from accepted doctrine concerning the justification of 
protections for commercial speech, the treatment of corporate speech under campaign finance 
law, the secondary weight traditionally accorded in practice to listener interests under the 
First Amendment, and the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate managers.  While my 
 291 Although the Court upheld regulations of corporate speech in Austin and McConnell, it did so on 
the basis of finding compelling state interests that justified the regulations under strict scrutiny, not on 
the basis that strict scrutiny was not required. 
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conclusions may not be necessarily entailed by—or in some cases entirely consistent with—
established legal doctrine, nor is it likely that today’s Supreme Court would accept them, 
they could be accepted without major breaks with established precedent or its underlying 
principles.  That is, it is not difficult to “get there from here.” 
In arguing from within received doctrine, I have accepted for purposes of argument 
the theoretical framework the courts have used as a basis for ascribing to listeners a strong 
epistemic interest in “open debate” (meaning debate free from direct government restraints, 
though not free from government-supported structures imposed by an economic system 
marked by great inequality).  But the relation between listeners’ ability to receive messages 
unimpeded by government interference and a general societal interest in knowledge and 
justified belief—or autonomy— has been, at best, grossly oversimplified in First Amendment 
jurisprudence in several respects.  First, power imbalances—and consequent imbalances in 
ability to be heard—among individuals and groups with different perspectives may obscure 
understanding more than would a simple lack of debate.292 Second, natural science, the area 
of inquiry most widely regarded as achieving gains in knowledge, does not proceed on the 
basis that all voices or viewpoints merit equal hearing, nor that the hearing an idea receives 
should be proportional to the funds available to broadcast it; free inquiry is balanced by 
deference to expertise.   
Finally, whatever pitfalls may attach to allowing government to judge the value of 
speech, one may question the Court’s insistence that more speech is always better, or that all 
speech contributes—however marginally—to autonomy or to the social pursuit of 
knowledge.  The Justices have been quick to label any restrictions on advertising in order to 
prevent behavior from being influenced in undesirable ways as “manipulation” of citizens’ 
minds.293 Such manipulation is central to what the First Amendment is supposed to protect 
against: “The essence of ... forbidden censorship is thought control.”294 But what if much 
 292 The epistemic ideal may be more like Habermas’ counterfactual “ideal speech situation,” in which 
each voice has equal chance to be heard and to respond, see Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Theory of 
Communicative Competence, 13 Inquiry 360 (1970), or like Meiklejohn’s model of the town meet-
ing, see Meiklejohn, supra note 225, at 24-27, than like the courts’ ideal of an unregulated market of 
ideas. 293 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); Edge, 509 U.S. at 
436 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring).    294 Police Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
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commercial advertising is closer to thought control, or to manipulation on the order of 
subliminal advertising, hypnotism, or injection with drugs increasing suggestibility, than to 
advancing reasoned discourse?  If so, regulation might actually protect listener autonomy.  A 
similar complaint was raised against popular culture in general (and radio in particular) over 
sixty years ago by Meiklejohn: “It is misinterpretations such as this which ... are giving the 
name ‘freedoms’ to the most flagrant enslavements of our minds and wills.”295 
295 Quoted in Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 255).  Criticisms of 
commercial speech doctrine along related lines have been developed more recently in Ronald K.L. 
Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 697 (1993); Tamara R. Piety, 
“Merchants of Discontent: An Exploration of the Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the 
Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 Seattle U.L. Rev. 377 (2001); and Daniel Hays Lowenstein, 
“Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 Cinc. L. Rev. 1205, 1220-23 
(1988). 
